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THE PHILOSOPHY OF SAMUEL BUTLER

by

Catharine Baillie

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THE UNIVERSITY OF ALBERTA

THE PHILOSOPHY OF SAMUEL BUTLER

A DISSERTATION

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The undersigned hereby certify that they have read and recommend to the School of Graduate Studies for acceptance, a thesis entitled The Philosophy of Samuel Butler submitted by Catharine Baillie, B.A., in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts.

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THE PHILOSOPHY OF SAMUEL BUTLER

ABSTRACT

Samuel Butler, in reaction to his conventional upbringing in a clerical household in Victorian times, attacked the religion, art, education, ethics, family life and biology of his day. Rejecting orthodox Christianity and the natural selection of Darwinism, Butler sets forth his religion, a pragmatic, empirical philosophy of creative evolution, based on the Lamarckian view that variation is directed by intelligent sense of need with continued personality and memory. All organisms have a degree of consciousness, memory and will. If they try to develop an eye or an innate ability to skate, they can eventually succeed, one generation passing on to another a residue of organic modification or unconscious memory which gradually accumulates until it produces the organ or instinct required. All creatures are part of the living God, the inherent will or intelligence of the universe. Butler combines will with instinct, habit with organic function, mind with adaptation to environment so that intelligence may take over evolution and dedicate it to rational, moral and social ends. This religion of the will or Life Force limits reason and emphasizes instinctive living, and freedom from social evil for the successful continuance of the race.

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CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION.

As I read tributes to the late George Bernard Shaw, I could not help recalling the life and work of his precursor, Samuel Butler, who influenced Shaw greatly. "It drives one almost to despair," Shaw writes, "when one sees so extraordinary a study of English life as Butler's posthumous Way of all Flesh making so little impression that when I produce plays in which Butler's extraordinary fresh, free and future-piercing suggestions have an obvious share, I am met with vague cacklings about Ibsen and Neitzche Really the English do not deserve to have great men."

In his essay, Butler When I Was a Nobody,^x Shaw states that Butler was a great man, as great men go. Shaw considers that Butler put the secret of his greatness into a single sentence of six words, which he addressed to Shaw as they were crossing the courtyard of the British Museum together. He said with the most intense emphasis, "Darwin banished mind from the universe." He added, "My grandfather quarrelled with Darwin's father; I quarrelled with Darwin; and my regret for having no son is that he cannot quarrel with Darwin's son."

In Shaw's opinion, Butler should be considered in the roll of fame neither as novelist nor biologist but as meta-

biologist. "This," he explains, "is perhaps because I call myself a metabiologist and was the first, so far as I know, to bring that necessary term into the vocabulary."

Butler, like Shaw, was a creative evolutionist, a man with a purpose to expose the error of Darwinism and to explain the theory of vitalism, the creative life force existing in all things. He is called "an earnest atheist" but in reality he was a theist, a believer in a living God, active in all beings.

In considering Butler, one might think that he was a "sport", a person apart from his world of evolution, one who had made a quick jump instead of a change by gradual variation, but on second thought he is seen to be of his age, in the middle-class, gentlemanly life.

Butler was an amateur novelist, evolutionist, philosopher, theologian, painter, musician and worker in Homeric and Shakespearean research. To his efforts in these various fields he brought freshness, independence and originality of thought. He defined his standards and exposed his prejudices. At his own expense he published his books on which the loss was little short of one thousand pounds.

Butler wrote as a social satirist, ridiculing the follies of contemporary life. He attacked people, their laws, conventions and institutions, and as a result told his generation many unpalatable truths about itself. He argued endlessly, repeated his assertions, and treated his opponents as "moral delinquents and damned fools." As a critic of his

period, he showed an abundance of common sense, "with an unusually disciplined intelligence."

His humorous method led to distrust and misunderstanding of his work. Mr. Festing Jones points out in his Sketch of the Life of Samuel Butler,^x that Butler, to veil his own earnestness, "turned most naturally to humor, employing it in a spirit of reverence, as all the great humorists have done, to express his deepest and most serious convictions." His contemporaries did not know whether he was to be taken seriously, and therefore found his opinions disconcerting.

It is then, only, with consideration of humor as an integral part of his makeup that we can understand Butler. His mind was dual, one with a strain of anti-intellectualism, where he puts limits on reason and logic, and emphasizes compromise.

A feature of Samuel Butler's work is the remarkable interdependence of thought shown in everything he wrote. He had the gift of seizing the vital connection between seemingly unconnected things, showing the material relevance between the widely different points of view of thought and life. The classics, science, music, painting, philosophy-- all engaged his attention; but between these studies he had established a real and vital connection. Herein he showed his genius. His mind was of such capacity that he could correlate the various ideas and aspects of life so that each one of them

x - Biographical Sketch as Introduction to Selected Essays, by S. Butler.

illustrated some relevant thought. In his written work, we frequently come across the same idea, probably clothed in a different form but expressing a certain mental compactness seldom found in critical writers. So these thoughts and theories constantly recur throughout all his books. In Erewhon, for example, we have the germ of all the ideas later developed in his other writings. His novel, The Way of All Flesh, is a working out in practice of his theories.

Butler wrote to please himself and a few friends. His books pestered and worried him until they got themselves written. In all, he wrote twenty-seven books. Of these only two are at all known today. One is Erewhon, a brilliant satire on Victorian compromise with its timid routine-loving passiveness; whether it is shown in its true light, hardly disguised by transposition; or whether the picture of a rational civilization is set up over against it. The second survivor, Butler's only real novel, The Way of All Flesh, is a unique period-study of Victorian home life.

In his own time Butler was an unsuccessful writer, a literary pariah. He was not considered worthy of attack. Bewildered by the contempt and neglect of people, who, like himself were presumably engaged in a search for truth, he struck out at Darwin as his chief opponent. Darwin advised one of his supporters: "Do not expend much powder and shot on Mr. Butler, for ~~his~~ is really not worth it. His work is merely ephemeral."

Time, however, has avenged the neglect of Butler by his contemporaries. Even before his death the idea of uncon-

scious memory was accepted by orthodox biologists. He is now considered one of the most remarkable English writers of the latter part of the 19th. century. Illustrating the changed attitude of the scientific world to Butler and his theories is a reference in Darwin and Modern Science, a collection of essays published in 1909 by the University of Cambridge, in commemoration of the Darwin centenary. In that work Professor Bateson speaks of Butler as "the most brilliant and by far the most interesting of Darwin's opponents, whose works are at length emerging from oblivion." Today he may be considered as "a mid-Victorian modern", in that he advocates Lamarckism, pragmatism, Bergsonism.

In these days of specialization, it is refreshing to dwell upon the varied accomplishments of such a truly rounded intelligence. The dignity of the human intelligence was one of the lessons he tried to teach. Man's will and his intellect are the strongest things in the universe. Butler often repeated his belief that everyone, according to the measure of his worth, will achieve a new life after death in the thoughts and lives of others. We see, then, that his life beyond the grave is his truest and happiest, passed in the profoundest sleep and yet immortal in the thoughts and life of George Bernard Shaw and others yet unborn -- in his own words "those who have been begotten of our work and who have for the time come up in our room." "He lives who does and he who does still lives, whether he wots of his own deeds or not ..." x

CHAPTER TWO

THE MAN AND HIS WORK

Samuel Butler was born in Nottinghamshire on December 4th., 1835. His father was a clergyman, Rev. Thomas Butler; his grandfather was the famous Dr. Samuel Butler, headmaster of Shrewsbury School and later Bishop of Lichfield. When eight years old, the young Butler travelled with his family to Italy, which he henceforth referred to as his "second country."

Two years later he attended school at Allesley near Coventry; and then in 1848 went to Shrewsbury School, whose headmaster Dr. B. H. Kennedy he reproduced as Dr. Skinner in his autobiographical novel The Way of All Flesh. At this period he first heard the music of Handel, who remained his favorite composer. Italy, Handel, and a fondness for drawing became the loves of his life.

In 1854 Butler went to St. John's College, Cambridge, where he took his degree in classics, being twelfth in the First Class of the Classical Tripos in 1858. Writing for the Eagle, his college magazine, he produced sketches which showed the early development of that gift of irony which Butler was afterwards to wield with such brilliant mastery.

Interested in the evangelical teaching of the Cambridge Simeonites, he was stimulated to write an amusing parody on one of their tracts. Like Ernest Pontifex in The Way of All

Flesh, who came under this religious influence, he dropped a copy of his tract into the Simeonites' letter-boxes as a counter-attack to their uncouth utterances.

Other articles at this time foreshadow the quality of his later work and the necessity for his writing. He remarks concerning his subjects: "Unless we have something which we feel urged to say, it is better to say nothing."

Destined for the Church, Butler went to London where he lived and worked among the poor in a West End parish. His father, Dr. Butler, a Church of England canon, was outraged when the young man refused ordination on the grounds that infant baptism was ineffectual. The canon then ordered his son to become either a schoolmaster or a barrister. Instead Butler, who wished to be an artist, set sail for New Zealand in 1859; and, helped by money from his father, became a prosperous sheep-rancher at Canterbury.

His letters home were put together by his father and brought out in his first book, A First Year at Canterbury Settlement. The book gives a good picture of the kind of life Butler led for five years, working "like a common servant" in semi-solitude, devoting all his attention to sheep and "country".^x To Butler, as to all other serious emigrants, sheep were the only things that mattered. "You must remember they are your masters, and not you theirs; you exist for them, not they for you." They were, as he might have put it later, extensions, and most important ones, of his own

personality.^x

While Butler was in New Zealand, he read Charles Darwin's Origin of Species and became Darwin's ardent admirer. In 1862 he wrote a dialogue upon the Origin of Species, published in the New Zealand Press. This he followed by a letter in the same newspaper on Darwin and the Machines, which developed into his theory of evolution and became part of his book, Erewhon, published in 1872.

But Butler had no intention of spending his life as a sheep-rancher; and after five years he sold out for a sum which would likely yield him sufficient income for the rest of his life.

When he returned to London, he took rooms in Clifford's Inn where he remained until his death in 1902, living on the income from his money invested in securities. Unfortunate speculation in these brought about a visit to Canada in retrieve some losses, and caused him to live in somewhat straitened circumstances for years, but he managed to visit his beloved Italy each summer for a holiday.

Upon his return to England from New Zealand in 1864, Butler's ambition to become a painter led him to study art seriously. From 1868 to 1876 he was an occasional exhibitor at the Royal Academy. At Heatherley's School of Art he met Miss Eliza Mary Ann Savage, whom he pictures in his sonnets

in 1901 as "plain and lame and fat and short, Forty and over-kind", yet who remained his stimulating and devoted friend until her death in 1885.

Spurred to creativeness by a Russian lady whom he met in Venice in 1866, who left him with the words: "Et maintenant, monsieur, vous allez creer", Butler turned from painting to literature and published Erewhon in 1872. This successful satire, first published anonymously, persuaded him towards regular book-writing. In 1873 he brought out The Fair Haven, in which he cleared his doubts about the evidence for the Resurrection. No sooner was this done than, encouraged by his faithful friend, Miss Savage, he set to work on the first draft of The Way of All Flesh.

Painting still occupied his first attention until 1876 when he exhibited his last Royal Academy picture, and from that point he turned decisively toward writing. He published his first book on creative evolution, Life and Habit, in 1877, and followed this with Evolution Old and New in 1879, Unconscious Memory in 1880, and Luck or Cunning? in 1886.

In 1881 Butler brought out Alps and Sanctuaries containing material gathered during his Italian holidays and illustrated with photographs by the author himself. In this book he reveals his love of Italy and of primitive Italian art. Thereafter he worked again over the manuscript of his novel, rewriting much of it; but presently he laid it aside, having made up his mind against publication while many of the real people characterized in it were still alive. Hence-

forward the text remained as he had left it and was published in 1903, a year after his death.

In 1885 Butler and his close friend, Henry Festing Jones, published an album of music, and in 1888 Narcissus, an Oratorio Buffo in the Handelian manner.

Upon the death of his father in 1886 Butler received sufficient inheritance to end his financial difficulties. Since his New Zealand days, he had been supporting not only himself but also a beloved friend, Charles Paine Pauli, whom Butler considered an "ideal gentleman". Though now considerably richer, Butler continued to live simply at Clifford's Inn. Each day he walked to the British Museum Reading Room where he did his writing. In the essay Quis Desiderio ...? he gives a humorous account of his dismay at the removal from its accustomed place of Frost's Lives of Eminent Christians, the one book indispensable to him as a sloping desk for writing.

Though Butler did not assume the responsibilities of marriage and family life, he fulfilled his biological needs through the attentions of a French mistress, Madame Lucie Dumas, whom he visited each fortnight until her death. For fifteen of those twenty years he was sufficiently cautious not to reveal to her his true identity.

In 1888 Butler published Ex Voto, a work which concerns Varallo statuary and the art of his favorite sculptor, Tabachetti. While collaborating with Mr. Jones, on the oratoria Ulysses, Butler became so interested in the work of Homer that he translated both the Iliad and Odyssey into modern English prose, and astounded classical scholars by setting out

to prove that the *Odyssey* had been composed at Trapani, in Sicily, by a lively young woman, Nausicaa.

While writing a book on the elucidation of Shakespeare's sonnets, Butler learned the series by heart and composed several in the Shakespearean form on the subjects of Handel and Miss Savage. His unusual poem Psalm of Montreal with refrain "O God! O Montreal!" is the one contribution by him best remembered by certain readers.

In spite of the dislike he had already displayed for the callings of church and school, he produced in 1896 a laudatory life of his grandfather, Dr. Samuel Butler, who had been first a headmaster and then a bishop. As Mr. Jones says, "he became penetrated with an almost Chinese reverence for his ancestor", and the result was a very full account of his activities given for the most part in letters, diaries and personal notes.

Butler died in England on June 18, 1902, having been brought back ill from Italy by his clerk, Alfred Emery Cathie, "the best body-guard and the most engaging of any man in London", in Butler's description.

Reprints of certain articles from the Universal Review together with two lectures were printed as Essays of Life, Art and Science in 1904, and reprinted with The Humor of Homer in 1913. These essays show Butler's humor free and unrestrained. There is a light-hearted irony in them and a freshness which he never surpassed. The personal element shines through unmistakably in each of them.

At his death in 1902 Butler left five bound volumes

of notes with the contents dated and indexed and more than enough sheets for a sixth volume. These were intended for his own private use as a quarry from which to take material for his writing, but he hardly ever used them in this way, as he usually restated a note from memory in his books. However the making of the notes must have had an influence on the formation of his style. Extracts from the volumes of notes have been arranged and edited by Henry Festing Jones and printed and reissued several times since.

In his lifetime the public knew him as "Erewhon" Butler, a curious, cranky critic who had produced a strangely mixed collection of books. He had offended theologians by his denial of the fact of Christ's death upon the Cross; he had offended the scientists by denial of the doctrine of evolution by natural selection, and by support of Lamarckism. He had affronted classicists by his translation of the Iliad and Odyssey into breezy English, and by his contention that the "Homer" of the Odyssey was the pseudonym of an unknown Sicilian woman. He had ventured to uphold Handel as foremost musician, and Tabachetti as the finest artist. In short, in the opinion of many Victorians, Butler was a dabbler in many arts and sciences and no authority upon any.

CHAPTER THREE

SOCIAL AND MORAL PHILOSOPHY

I have considered at some length the ideas found in the book Erewhon since they show the trend of social and psychological thought developed by Samuel Butler during a ten-year period while he has gathering material for the book, and since these ideas give in embryo his biological theories.

Erewhon is the story of an imaginary journey to an unknown isolated country "Nowhere", and in it Butler has satirized the customs of Victorian England. While picturing Erewhonian society Butler is actually measuring the institutions of the Victorians by his standard of common sense. He steadily keeps his eyes on the English community that he is satirizing.

The journey and description of the country in the opening chapters came from the author's own experiences in New Zealand. They form a realistic setting for the ideas to follow, for Erewhon is not really a story, but a series of humorously expressed moral and social judgments with a story built round them.

Butler's imagination worked to construct a framework for his satires on materialist science, musical bank religion, and family life. It is a notable fact that these

three things were the main substance of what Butler already wanted to say at this stage. From the Book of the Machines stemmed all his later views on evolution; from the Musical Banks came his attacks on false religion and from the World of the Unborn is derived the handling of the problem of parenthood in The Way of All Flesh.

H. F. Jones calls his memoir, Samuel Butler, Author of Erewhon, and the Victorian public knew him as Erewhon Butler. There is much more justice in the description than at first appears, for in Erewhon almost all that was characteristic of Butler is found in embryo or fully developed. The impulse that drove him to find expression in art is suggested in a few pages of admirable description. The main body of his social criticism is to be found there. His early comment upon the Darwinian theory of evolution has its place. His criticism of religion finds a voice. There is even a suggestion of his love of music in the Handel motif of the guardian statues. And above all there is a work of satire and imagination in which Butler definitely emerges as the satirist of his time.

Erewhon is a brilliant fantasy about a world in which sickness is treated as a crime and crime as a sickness, as is coming to be the case today; and civilization rests upon two banks, one financial, which men invest in but deprecate, the other religious, which they praise to High Heaven but seldom invest in. Machines instead of being worshipped as the source

from which all blessings flow were execrated and forbidden. Erewhon was Victorian England back to front; and the result was very amusing.

Butler allowed the original objects of his satire to lead him to his conclusions rather than any haphazard method. It was the meaning and application contained in the Erewhonian ethics and institutions that were his first concern. His book is paradoxical, for it was Butler's delight to turn things inside out or upside down, and to examine them from a new point of view, which although absurd, threw new light on problems of real life.

Butler, brought up in a clerical household, in many respects remained of a clerical mind; therefore it was natural for him to make his bourgeois hero a clerical man. The hero supposes that the Erewhonians, partly because of their lack of religion, are the lost ten tribes of Israel, and he resolves to convert them. In this he had already had some experience, having reclaimed an old native chief, Chowbok, who in spite of a confusion of the individuality of Adelaide the Queen Dowager with that of Mary Magdalene was partly on the way to being "a sincere Christian".

Mr. Higgs, the hero of Erewhon, represents the middle class Englishman with his opinions of piety, respectability, and Christianity. His pious inclinations are mocked as he is trying to convert Chowbok. "He was indeed stony ground", Higgs remarks, "but by digging about him I might have at any

rate deprived him of all faith in the religion of his tribe, which would have been halfway towards making him a sincere Christian.

Higgs is impressed by the appearance of the Erewhonians, and admires their genial manners and social grace. Butler pictures them somewhat as the Italian peasant people whom he had met on his journeys to Italy.

Throughout his writings, Butler stresses the good life as the instinctive life of good breeding, good taste, good manners, the importance of social graces, the life of his ideal gentleman. In one of his notes he states that the Swell, the ideal gentleman, is not sufficiently appreciated. Butler wrote: "People ask complainingly what swells have done The good swell is the creature towards which all nature has been groaning and travailing together until now. He is an ideal. He shows what may be done in the way of good breeding, health, looks, temper and fortune."

In Erewhon Butler emphasizes the analogy between crime and disease. With his happy faculty of turning ideas upside down, Butler inverts body and mind, crime and disease. Illness is treated as a crime, and punished according to the severity of the illness. On the other hand, crimes are treated as diseases and looked after as are illnesses with us. A man who has committed a crime is carefully tended as suffering from a fit of immorality. Bad conduct is held to be the result of pre-natal or post-natal misfortune. The

strange part of the story, however, is that though the Erewhonians ascribe moral defects to the effect of misfortune either in character or surroundings, they will not listen to the plea of misfortune in cases that in England meet with sympathy and commiseration only. Just as our courts will punish a culprit, that diseased person, without inquiring into the degree of his responsibility in his crime, those of the Erewhonians will punish a patient, that guilty person, without inquiring into the degree of his responsibility for his illness. The latter absurdity is no other than our own; and to such as have eyes to see, it is pregnant with a profitable lesson.

Butler gives an account of a man who was accused of consumption. In the record of the trial, the judge in his summing up states: "You may say that it is not your fault. The answer is ready enough at hand, and it amounts to this - that if you had been born of healthy and well-to-do parents, and been well taken care of when you were a child, you would never have offended against the laws of your country, nor found yourself in your present disgraceful position. If you tell me that you had no hand in your parentage and education, and that it is therefore unjust to lay these things to your charge, I answer that whether your being in a consumption is your fault or no, it is a fault in you, and that it is my duty to see that against such faults as this the commonwealth shall be protected. You may say that it

is your misfortune to be criminal; I answer that it is your crime to be unfortunate."X

Ill-luck of any kind, or even ill-treatment at the hands of others, is considered an offence against society, inasmuch as it makes people uncomfortable to hear of it. Loss of fortune, therefore, or loss of some dear friend, is punished hardly less severely than physical delinquency. No one with any sense of self-respect will place himself on an equality in the matter of affection with those who are less lucky than himself in birth, health, money, good looks, capacity or anything else.

The sojourn of Mr. Higgs at the home of the Nosnibors provides Butler with a setting for his satire on morality and family life. Mr. Nosnibor is made a swindler who has tricked a confiding widow out of her property. He is treated with commiseration for his lapse from virtue, and so illustrates the contrast between Erewhonian and Victorian notions of physical and moral health.

By this clever satire Butler subjects prevailing ideas on treatment of criminals to ridicule, and questions the right of society to inflict punishment; but while on one side this right is curtailed, on the other it is extended. For the treatment of cases that are with us criminal, the Erewhonians call in "straighteners" who prescribe for all these forms of mental indisposition.

The touch in Erewhon is light, but on the questions of moral and physical health much of Butler's Erewhonian philosophy is remarkably prescient. We recognize the value to a country of well-to-do healthy citizens, and we are beginning to treat the criminal less barbarously and more humanely as mentally diseased.

Regarding vice and virtue the Erewhonians "hold that unalloyed virtue is not a thing to be immoderately indulged in. The straighteners say that the most that can be truly said for virtue is that there is a considerable balance in its favor, and that it is on the whole a good deal better to be on its side than against it. Those men, they say, are best who are not remarkable either for vice or virtue."^x

Butler does not dwell at length on the social problem. The relations between class and class, or between master and man were not questions with which his mind was in any way concerned. This greatest and most acute critic of mid-Victorian morality has not a word to say about such things as these. Apart from a few scenes of "low life", seen as a thing vitally different from the life he depicted, Butler's scenes and characters were all of the middle class, and took middle class ways of living for granted.

In another passage Butler points out that there is nothing unfair in punishing people for misfortune. Here it is society which must profit at the expense of the individual. That is the reason why a man who is son to a millionaire is so

richly rewarded - he is the most complex phenomenon so far produced, and society has every reason to be proud of him. But it is all luck and nothing else and simply the old story: "To him that hath shall be given." And in believing, as Butler believed, that God cared not much for the individual but a good deal for the race, he put this element of good fortune on a new footing; society rewards good fortune - good looks, physical well-being, a good bank balance, whether the result of our own efforts or not - because they are of value to society. In a man who possesses all these things society sees its own ideal. "Property, marriage, the law; as the bed to the river, so rule and convention to the instinct; and woe to him who tampers with the banks while the flood is flowing."X

Butler satirizes conventions concerning death with his story of the Erewhonian custom of marking condolence. On the death of a friend of the family, the mourners write no letters of sympathy nor wear mourning, but they send little boxes of artificial tears, the number varying according to the degree of intimacy.

The Erewhonians are not less human than other people, and hence condone certain offences in an illogical fashion. "Want of logic is a merciful provision of nature, a buffer against collisions, a friction which upsets our calculations but without which existence would be intolerable, this crowning glory of human invention whereby we can be blind and see

at one and the same moment - this blessed inconsistency exists here as elsewhere."X The birth of a child is thus condoned. The illness of the mother is carefully concealed, and the offence after a time forgotten. Some stricter moralists maintained that it was wicked for a woman to have children at all, since her health was impaired in the process; these writers could not see that the good which came out of the evil was any moral justification. Yet the necessity of the case caused the passing over of such events in silence.

Butler uses the Musical Banks as a neat allegory to satirize conventional religion and church-going morality, and with them a great deal of the Victorian piety and respectability against which he revolted. He attacks the family life of the Victorians based on Ydgrun (Mrs. Grundy), the religion of respectability.

The Erewhonians had two currencies, one used in the Musical Banks of no direct commercial value, the other that with which business was done and in which the managers and cashiers of the Musical Banks were paid. Mrs. Nosnibor, a prominent Erewhonian citizen, who supported the Musical Banks, represents the typical pious woman that would argue on the necessity of going to church for the sake of conformity and respectability, not because of belief.

In describing the unhappy, cramped expression of the cashiers, Butler draws freely from his knowledge of the life of the clergy; their suppressed lives with repression of doubt,

their impossible ideal of morals, their unsuccessful training of their children, the giving out of their energy and service to others with their inevitable, irritable reaction at home.

The description of the changes and additions to the Musical Banks, of the stained glass windows, of the enlarged organs is indicative of the reforms of the Broad Church groups in England. Butler is satirizing the Church's attempt to draw in congregations by dressing up the building. Reference to the bendable currency suggests the adjustable religious standards of the Victorians.

The author is maintaining that the Erewhonians by supporting their religious views have to pay their respects to custom. He objects to our priests saying that they know more about the unseen world. Butler believes, like Huxley, though in different fashion, that the unknown world is unknown.

In later passages Butler goes on to consider the quasi-idolatrous views held, a belief in anthropomorphic religion, that in which men tend to turn abstractions such as justice, fear, love into gods by giving them personalities in their own minds. Mr. Higgs, a pious, earnest man tries to convince Arowhena that she is wrong in believing that justice is a living person.

When Arowhena gives her view of Higgs' God, Butler is here turning back on his own idea. "She asked me what I should think if she were to tell me that my God, whose nature and attributes I had been explaining to her, was but the ex-

pression for man's highest conception of goodness, wisdom and power; that in order to generate a more vivid conception of so glorious a thought man had personified it and called it by a name; that it was an unworthy conception of the Deity to hold him personal, inasmuch as escape from human contingencies became thus impossible; that the real thing men should worship was the Divine whereinsoever they could find it; that God was but man's way of expressing his sense of the Divine."^x

To this conception Higgs answers that there were authentic accounts of men who had been spoken to by the Deity himself, and of one prophet who had been allowed to see the back parts of God through the hand that was laid over his face. Butler is here using Higgs as a representative of the obtuse person of his day.

The true object of worship of the Erewhonians was Ydgrun. Their real religion was their adherence to custom, their conformity to their code of respectability. In discussing high and low Ydgrunites Butler is satirizing the double standard of behavior. He approves adherence to the proper standard, that of the high Ydgrunites. "The example of a real gentleman is the best of all gospels."^x The only religion of the high Ydgrunites was that of self-respect and consideration for others. They represent Butler's ideal of behavior to which he lived up in his personal doings except as a writer. The high Ydgrunites are the free self-possessed

x - Erewhon, 142.

Ibid. 147.

persons whom Butler admired. They conform to custom and only break away when instinct tells them it is best to do so.

Butler dismisses the idea of immortality or future heaven or hell as necessary to morals. He attacks the suggestion of the fear of hell as essential to the moral code. Most Erewhonians oppose immortality as immoral in that it makes the present life of second importance and is "an impatient cutting of the Gordian knot of life's problems."

The chapter on Birth Formulae is a satire on family life in general, attacking the orthodox doctrine of original sin. It was this latter question that caused Butler's refusal to be ordained and his decision not to become a clergyman. He is satirizing the folly of infant baptism and confirmation.

In the chapter on the World of the Unborn we learn that the Erewhonians reverse the process of time saying that we are drawn through life backwards with our faces to the past instead of to the future; that the future and the past are as a panorama upon two rollers; that the present is one of the minor compromises of which human life is full - for it lives only on sufferance of the past and future. In picturing the world of the unborn Butler is satirizing the Victorian concept of heaven. Everybody is happy in that world yet clamoring to get out. Though warned by their elders, the spiritual pastors of the unborn world, to consider the risks they will assume, the most foolish of them agree to the uncertain conditions which they must accept. When they have decided to leave, they must go before the magistrate, sign an affidavit, take a

potion which will destroy their memory and sense of identity, and become a bare vital principle to harass two married persons until they get themselves born.

Butler in this inversion is satirizing the attitude of parents to children that the latter owe their parents a debt for having been born, as he presents the idea that the children tormented their parents till they were born. The author, too, is insisting upon the continuity of life from ancestors beyond that of the particular individual.

Yet though they rather dislike the children, the Erewhonians as potential parents, are willing to give them the best chance possible by maintaining their own physical fitness - as indeed they are bound to do by the laws of their land.

Butler considers the question of money as one great problem between parents and children. He emphasizes, as does his disciple Shaw, that money is necessary to stimulate living. He considers that there is a good deal to be said for money. The poor cannot afford to be moral, for they have to live. In Butler's opinion a child is not a satellite of his parents but a definite personality. He considers it wrong to keep children subject by "will-shaking" at them.

To Butler it is a prime error for parents to insist on their children studying "hypothetics", which is good for nothing. The child should be given an early apprenticeship in the art of living, a practical education whereby he is to earn money, and some choice in the way of making money.

The ideas of Butler on the Colleges of Unreason and hypothetics are drawn from his experiences at Shrewsbury and Cambridge. He expresses straight criticism of a classical education, but mingles paradox with his own opinions. He is not merely condemning Unreason but is also arguing on the question of logic versus instinct. It is not wise to push logic too far. With everything we must include its opposite, logic and illogic, reason and unreason. "Extremes are alone logical, but they are always absurd; the mean is illogical, but an illogical mean is better than the sheer absurdity of an extreme."

Life is a compromise in which common sense counts for it knows how to balance reason with unreason. The instinct within, the power of common sense, pushes one in the right direction. As part of the continuing life force, it preserves the balance between. This is Butler's philosophy of common sense. He juggles with the idea of reason as he did with that of God.

In the words of the Professor of Worldly Wisdom, he argues for the avoidance of extremes in originality of thought and in progress. What society wants to do is to fit the individual into society. A great man has to sacrifice himself, his genius and his originality, for it is as immoral to be too far in front of one's own age as to lag too far behind it. This thought accords with the idea of the continuity of the life force, in that, for progress, one individual cannot get too far ahead or he will be out of line.

The Book of the Machines was expanded from an earlier essay, Darwin and the Machines. It is an analogy with human machines, but seems an onslaught upon the false use of analogy. Butler had a deep distrust of analogical argument, though he sometimes fell into it. He was fully convinced that the notion of human beings or living beings being just like machines was all wrong; and he took his usual course with every falsehood he came upon. He turned it back to front or upside down, and saw what it looked like reversed. How about seeing what would follow if one affirmed that machines were just like men? Butler tried it and found that it worked perfectly - to a conclusion just as absurdly logical as if one began the other way round. Whether they were meant humorously or not, these chapters on the tyranny of the machine were strangely prescient of the terrible dilemma of the twentieth century, as mankind experiences it in the horrors of war.

The second view of the machines, that held by Butler himself, was expanded from the article Lucubratio Eboria already published. The chief point is that the machines are tools, further limbs of the human body. A spade, for instance, lengthens the forearm and makes the hand a joint. Mind and matter ultimately become one in the unity of existence. "That old philosophic enemy, matter, the inherently and essentially evil, still hangs about the neck of the poor and strangles him: but to the rich, matter is immaterial; the elaborate organization of his extra-corporeal system has freed his soul."^x Thus millionaires are the most highly organized creatures in our society, since they can at will add to their identity a special

train or ship and go where and when they please.

The account of the Rights of Animals and of Vegetables serves as a lesson that it is unwise to push on to logical conclusions except with the purpose of recoiling from them as Butler represented the Erewhonians to have done, when, after giving up meat eating, they came to realize that no sharp line could be drawn between the lives of plants and animals. The moral is that the illogical is preferable to the absurd. With the story of the conscience-stricken young man eating meat, Butler satirizes the teachings on sex; the suppression of natural instincts is unhealthy for it produces hypocrisy.

Butler emphasizes his views concerning evolution. Life is a product of intelligence, conscious or unconscious. There is purpose in all life, even that of a potato. Both animals and plants have a common ancestry, and no appreciable difference in their germ cells. A germ develops into an organism similar to that of its ancestors, or dies in the attempt to fit itself to widely different circumstances. Butler stresses the intelligence of the organism, whereas Charles Darwin leaves no room for intelligence, making adaptation of the organism a matter of chance.

Butler sets forth an account of the laws, opinions and behavior of the Erewhonians. In so doing he has emphasized: their extensive use of logical theory so often a failure in practice; the inconsistencies which they condoned; their panic fear of giving themselves away; their views on money and machines; their foolish study of hypotheticals; their

double currency and the conduct of the Ydgrunites. All of these ideas have wide application to phases of Victorian life. The main satire in Erewhon, however, has to do with Butler's conception of life - his great theory of creative purposeful evolution of the unending life stream, from the primordial cell to man, of all life as one, perpetuated by an unconscious memory that embraces an urge to change. This hypothesis, fully developed in his four books on evolution, is discussed in the next chapter.

CHAPTER FOUR

CREATIVE EVOLUTION

The Origin of Species by Charles Darwin appeared in 1859, the year after Butler had taken his degree at Cambridge. Son of a clergyman, grandson of a bishop, and himself brought up to be a clergyman, Butler was to feel as sharply as any man the impact of the new wave of religious doubt that Darwin's book set in motion; and to him, as to many others, this one issue for a long time seemed to overshadow every other.

According to George Bernard Shaw, Darwin had converted Butler for six weeks, because "in those days we clever people who called ourselves Secularists, Freethinkers, Agnostics, Atheists, Positivists, Rationalists, or what not, and were classed by the Orthodox as Infidels doomed to eternal damnation, were Anti-Clericals snatching at any stick big enough to whack the parsons; and as the biggest stick then was the Natural Selection of Darwin and Wallace, carried to absurdity by Weismann, we all, Butler included, grabbed it and laid on joyously. Butler alone thought it out deeply and quickly enough to grasp the horror of its banishment of mind from the universe. The ensuing controversies only obscured the fundamental issue."^x

x - Saturday Review of Literature. April 29, 1950.

Samuel Butler always disliked strongly the idea of a mechanically determined universe; and the Darwinian doctrine of natural selection alienated his sympathy because it seemed to make an end of free will as the director of universal affairs. He was unhappy until he had rediscovered a form of the doctrine of evolution that put will or cunning, rather than luck, in the key place.

In The Way of All Flesh and in Erewhon the influence of Darwin's theory is plain. In Erewhon, Butler is puzzled, not having yet hit on the notion of creative evolution which he proclaimed in Life and Habit. In The Way of All Flesh, the notions of inherited habit and variation by means of willed adaptation to environment are invoked again and again - though probably many of these passages belong to the revised version. Between Erewhon and the revised version of The Way of All Flesh Butler had made his peace with the universe, and had found something to believe in as well as much to disavow. Life and Habit and the theory of evolution therein expressed were the turning point in Butler's mental attitude; he gained a new positive view of life from which he never departed.

Those who concentrated on Darwin's theory of Natural Selection as the explanation of all the adaptations which were the evidence for evolution became neo-Darwinians. Against these Butler led a reaction and stated his belief in Creative Evolution, that the impulse that produces evolution is creative. Creative evolutionists have observed that the will to do anything can and does, at a certain pitch of intensity set up by

conviction of its necessity, create and organize new tissue to do it with. Evolution shows them this direction of vitality doing all sorts of things: ridding the fish of legs, building lungs and arms for the land and gills and fins for the sea: offering a choice of any sort of bodily contrivance to maintain activity and to increase resources.^x

In substance, Butler, who hated Darwin's evolutionary theory of Natural Selection expressed his own views early in his career by denouncing in four volumes, the idea that man "survived or perished according to a process of natural selection into which neither God's will nor man's will nor any being's will appeared to enter at all." We survive, Butler argued, and Shaw after him, because "there is in each of us a limited power of adaptation, which makes it possible for us to face without disaster, or even with positive benefit, unexpected situations." Only if the unexpected demands too much of our strength and will, do we succumb.

The theory of evolution as Butler looked at it was not primarily a scientific view about animals, but a practical working notion about men. It had two main aspects: inherited memory which was habit, and cunning or will in the place of the blind chance of "natural selection" as the basis of variation and therefore of the evolutionary process.

The book Life and Habit, Butler's most important contribution to biology, emphasizes several main principles: the oneness of personality between parent and offspring; memory

x - G.B.Shaw. Preface in Back to Methuselah XVllll

on the part of the offspring of certain actions which it did when in the persons of its forefathers; the latency of that memory until it is rekindled by a recurrence of the associated ideas; the unconsciousness with which habitual actions come to be performed; the purposiveness of the actions of living beings, as of the machines which they make or select.

The chief subject matter of Life and Habit is the memory theory of heredity, an hypothesis which Butler henceforth retained. He wished to show that living beings have made themselves what they are, purposively, from sense of need. "All growth", he said, "is only somebody making something." And he wanted also to explain how the machines or organs which the creature made for its own purposes came to be thus made. So complete an identification between means and ends could only have been realized intelligently; and for the outside intelligence, which is supposed to direct the progress of the race, he substituted an intelligence residing within the creature itself. The problem then confronted him: how could the descendants of the primordial cell - how could any of the creatures in the whole chain of descent - intelligently do their work when they knew nothing about it? Butler answered that they did it by unconscious memory - personality existed through the ages from generation to generation, each ego inheriting the memory of its ancestors and being able to reproduce by inherited habit its ancestors' ways of coping with familiar situations. Thus the return of associated ideas awoke the memories proper to the occasion, and the creature is able

to do things about which otherwise it could know nothing.

Butler illustrates how all the actions we do best we do unconsciously. To reach this height of unconscious proficiency, we must have done the action very many times before; and this, we know, is exactly the case with all the things we do most easily; our breathing, the circulating of our blood, digesting and similar actions. Just in the same way the best thieves are those who are not aware of being thieves, the Kleptomaniacs,- the greatest hypocrites of the world are the unconscious hypocrites. It is the same, too, with all the first-rate bores. And these classes of people are the least likely to be cured of their unpleasant qualities because they are completely unconscious of any personal defect.

Not a scientist himself, Butler takes to task those so-called men of science whose ideal is in self-conscious knowledge. These people who know what they know are to be looked on with suspicion. They are a class of people living under the law rather than under grace. Butler criticized these men of science because he thought them dangerous; he feared that they would impose a worse despotism than even that of religion, since, in proportion to its size, they made the most powerful and influential group in the country. "It may well be we shall find we have escaped from one set of taskmasters to fall into the hands of others far more ruthless. The tyranny of the Church is light in comparison with that which future gener-

ations may have to undergo at the hands of the doctrinaires. The Church did uphold a grace of some sort as the summum bonum, in comparison with which all so-called earthly knowledge was unimportant."x Against this new menace Butler was determined to take a firm stand.

The step from self-consciousness to introspection is not a very wide one, and Butler was of the opinion that people who suffered from this malady were generally no good. Introspection is something that doesn't concern us; it means also that we are not doing the business that lies before us. Often it has a religious origin, though it is not a necessary accompaniment to religion. To Butler, therefore, the best kind of religion is that which teaches us that ultimately we can know nothing about the universe, except that we are an integral part of it, and that we had better tend to our own affairs. Everything in the world, he saw, that did its work best did it just because it knew what that immediate work was, and gave no thought to the future, or to those larger processes of which it was but a single component part. What, for example, could be more unpleasant than an introspective blood corpuscle - and doubtless they do exist, just like introspective men and women?

Human beings, then, and indeed all normal living creatures will do their work best when they do it unconsciously, because they remember having done it before in their ancestors.

The best proof that a creature knows how to do anything, and therefore knows its own business, is that it does it so unerringly. Butler could not see how hereditary instinct or Herbert Spencer's "accumulated experience of the race" explained these things, how, indeed, anything but memory would offer a satisfactory explanation. It is true that memories become more intense through repeated experience; yet the notion implies a sort of vicarious experience. Butler would transfer the experience of the race to the individual, although he knew that it was for the race rather than the individual that Nature showed her most affectionate regard. To Butler the unerring nature of our unconscious actions is a proof of the force that our past experiences assert within us.

We must suppose the continuity of life between living beings to be such that the successor is but a part of the life of his progenitor, imbued with all his memories, profiting by all his experiences, and only unconscious of the extent of his own memories and experiences owing to their vastness and already infinite repetitions.

In discussing personal identity, Butler considers that personality and personal identity carry on not only between a baby and the old man of eighty into which it developed, but also between the embryo before birth and after. So, too, the impregnated ovum must be described as identical with the man of eighty into which it ultimately developed. Birth and death in fact are nothing but arbitrary divisions set up as convenient for social and legal purposes. It is purely ar-

bitrary to suppose that personality begins at birth and ends at death. Birth has been made too much of as a line of demarcation; birth is the beginning of doubt, the end of certainty and of settled convictions. Birth is the beginning of consciousness, as the life before birth is the unconscious performing of the life we know best.

In spite of the fact that there is no discontinuity between the embryo and the human being of eighty, man is a creature made up of a vast number of subordinate individual cells which have their separate lives within him and have their say in his actions and behavior. Our physical organisms are made up of myriads of smaller organisms, which may be unaware of our existence but which form parts of us. Personal identity, therefore, is manifold in its nature and extends forward and backward. As the subordinate personalities in our bodies are parts and processes of us, so are we but parts and processes of life-at-large, the Life Force. Thus personality involves the probable unity of all animal and vegetable life as being nothing but one single creature, of which the component members are but, as it were, individual cells.

The self-development of each new life in succeeding generations, the various stages through which it passes, the manner in which it prepares delicate structures, the many elaborate instincts which it exhibits on birth - all point in the direction of habit and memory as the only causes which could produce them. Each ego inherits the memory of its ancestors and is able to reproduce by inherited habit its an-

cestors' ways of coping with familiar situations. Life is memory; the embryo must remember in order to live.


But memory does not work continuously, as it may fall into abeyance and only reassert itself with the return of the associated ideas. A hen does not remember anything about its past life as an egg, any more than we remember ourselves as embryos; the hen possesses only the memories of its previous existences as a hen. Just in the same way a hen's egg remembers what it did before when it was an egg, and acts accordingly. Every organism when placed in a certain environment remembers its own behavior when previously in that environment; if, however, it is placed in surroundings which recall no proper memories, it must attempt to adjust itself or inevitably die. We must consider each organism from its point of view. "A hen", says Butler, "is only an egg's way of making another egg."

In a note on Reproduction Butler wrote: "Its base must be looked for, not in the desire of the parents to reproduce but in the discontent of the germs with their surroundings inside these parents, and a desire on their part to have a separate maintenance." Weismann began with the germ as immortal, striving to reproduce itself though it is in no wise affected by, nor does it itself modify the bodies in which it resides. Butler also began with the germ as a starting point, although, unlike Weismann, he could not believe in the non-transmission of acquired characters, or in the complete isolation of the germ cells. In the world of the Unborn in

Erewhon, Butler, in expressing the dissatisfaction of the germ with its existence there and its struggle to reach the world, is emphasizing the desire of the germ to reproduce.

With his theory that instinct was inherited memory, Butler was able to explain many familiar facts. Those creatures who are longest in reaching maturity would be the longest lived; lateness of marriage in those of good health should tend to longevity of offspring; failure of memory would bring about ill health and decay. We should expect that all the qualities of human thought and character are to be found in the embryo; that all species are occasionally benefited by crossing, if the spread of conflicting memories be not too wide; that hybrids may be generally sterile because of the internal tumult of conflicting memories resulting in the death of the embryo. Further the memory theory of heredity may be used to explain the tendency of plants and animals to revert to the wild state when freed after several generations of domestication.

Butler considers a very important difficulty in the way of instinct as hereditary habit is an adequate explanation of the instincts of neuter insects. Charles Darwin writes: "But it would be a serious error to suppose that the greater number of instincts have been acquired by habit in one generation, and then transmitted by inheritance to succeeding generations. It can be clearly shown that the most wonderful instincts with which we are acquainted - namely, those of the hive-bee, and of many ants, could not possibly have been ac-



quired by habit."x

Darwin supposes that these modifications of structure and instinct have been effected by the accumulation of numerous slight, profitable, spontaneous variations on the part of fertile parents, which has caused them to lay this or that particular kind of egg, which should develop into a kind of bee or ant, with this or that particular instinct, which instinct is merely a co-ordination with structure, and in no way attributable to use or habit in preceding generations.

Butler ~~argues~~ argues that the habit of laying this particular kind of egg might be due to use and memory in previous generations on the part of fertile parents, "for the numerous slight spontaneous variations" on which "natural selection" is to work must have had some cause than which none more reasonable than sense of need and experience presents itself; and there seems hardly any limit to what long-continued faith and desire, aided by intelligence, may be able to effect.

Butler drew on the teachings of Lamarck, for both believed in a theory of evolution "through need, faith, intelligence, memory; both leaned toward a teleological explanation of the evolutionary process. A continual striving, a trying, stimulated by the will of the creature was what Lamarck taught as the basis of evolution.

Sense of need is the directing force in the Lamarckian system; and Butler felt convinced that the explanation of

this evolutionist was far more satisfactory than the "small fortuitous variations" of Darwin and the haphazard unintelligent blindness of his theory of evolution. Butler's criticisms of Darwin, which appear in the last pages of Life and Habit are thus concerned with a vital question in Darwin's teaching.

"The weak point in Mr. Darwin's theory", he says, "would seem to be a deficiency, so to speak, of motive power to originate and direct the variations which time is to accumulate. It deals admirably with the accumulation of variations in creatures already varying, but it does not provide a sufficient number of sufficiently important variations to be accumulated. Given the motive power which Lamarck suggested, and Mr. Darwin's mechanism would appear (with the help of memory, as bearing upon reproduction, of continued personality, and of the vanishing tendency of consciousness) to work with perfect ease However we may differ from Mr. Darwin in detail, the present general acceptance of evolution must remain as his work, and a more valuable work can hardly be imagined. Nevertheless I cannot think that "natural selection" working upon small, fortuitous, indefinite, unintelligent variations, would produce the results we see around us."x

"Mr. Darwin says that there is no good evidence in support of any great principle, or tendency on the part of the creature itself, which would steer variation, as it were, and keep its head straight, but that the most marvellous adaptations of structures to needs are simply the result of small

and blind variations, accumulated by the operation of "natural selection", which is thus the main cause of the origin of species."x

In Life and Habit we see that Butler argues for the identity of memory and heredity, the transmission of acquired characteristics, the essential unity of life and the absence of any complete break between the generations, the continuous unity of life through a life force, and the conception of evolutionary growth as a gradual conservative absorption of improvements that have developed partly by the conscious desire of the organism, partly by lucky accident.

Butler, derived from the Origin of Species the impression that evolution and natural selection were practically the same thing. Such a reading owed almost everything to the jubilant reception of Darwin's work, since the author was at pains to point out that natural selection was "the main but not the exclusive means of modification!" But this misconception had a profound effect on Butler. In his four books dealing with one aspect of evolution or another he restored to general circulation such honorable names as Buffon, Lamarck and Erasmus Darwin and showed that the idea of evolution and much speculation as to its mechanism were antecedent to Darwin. Therefore in order to explain reasons for the confusion of Creative Evolution with Natural Selection I shall give here a little history of the conflict between the view of evolution taken by the Darwinians and called Natural Selec-

tion and that of Creative Evolution put forth by Samuel Butler and carried further by George Bernard Shaw.

The idea of evolution was stated in the opinion of the Greek philosopher Empedocles that all forms of life are transformations of four elements, Fire, Earth, Air and Water, effected by the two innate forces of attraction and repulsion or love and hate. Later, Aristotle, when he grouped animals with backbones as blood relations, began the sort of classification, which, when extended by Darwin to monkeys and men, so shocked Bishop Wilberforce of Oxford.

The celebrated French biologist Buffon, in 1749 published his theory of descent with modification and became the father of modern evolution. His claim to this title rests upon the scientific spirit of forty quartos which he wrote upon the subject of transformation of the species.

Linnaeus, the famous botanist (1707-1778), in the last edition of his System of Nature began to wonder whether the transmutation of species by variation might not be possible. The great poet Goethe divined that there must be some common stock from which all the species had sprung; that it was the environment of air that had produced the eagle, of water the seal, and of earth the mole.

Erasmus Darwin, the grandfather of Charles, carried the environment theory much further, pointing out instance after instance of modifications made in species apparently to adapt it to circumstances and environment: for instance, that the brilliant colors of the leopard conceal it in the

the tropical jungle.

In 1802 a German biologist named Treviranus stated his theory of evolution of man from the amoeba. In 1809 a French zoologist named Lamarck declared that species were an illusion produced by the shortness of our individual lives, and that they were constantly changing and melting into one another and into new forms as surely as the hand of a clock is continually moving, though it moves so slowly that it looks stationary to us. We have since come to believe not in the view that evolution proceeds by imperceptible degrees, but in the more modern view that it proceeds by abrupt mutations.

Evolution Old and New was designed by Butler to show how little justice had been done by Darwin to his intellectual predecessors, the eighteenth-century evolutionists, Buffon, Erasmus Darwin and Lamarck. Butler was quite unable to understand Darwin's attitude to them. He seems from the very first to have objected to the tone of the opening paragraph in the Origin of Species, which, in 1859, appeared "as a kind of literary Melchisedec, without father and without mother in the works of other people."

When the differences between Charles Darwin and Butler led to a personal quarrel, it is easy to see how entirely opposed their temperaments were and how little Darwin was fitted for controversy with "a clever and unscrupulous man like Mr. Butler." With Darwin as a naturalist Butler

had no quarrel. But in the naturalist trying to reach wide general conclusions based upon his own observations, Butler expected to find something of the philosopher. In this he was disappointed. "Mr. Darwin has generally gone to good sources", he says. "The ground of complaint against him is that he muddied the water after he had drawn it, and tacitly claimed to be the rightful owner of the spring, on the score of the damage he had effected."^x

Returning to the history of evolution in Evolution Old and New, we see that Butler gives a full exposition of the ideas on evolution of these three great pioneers, Buffon, Erasmus Darwin and Lamarck. In comparing the old and new theories, Butler chooses Lamarck to represent the teleological or vitalistic conception which he held.

Lamarck passed on from the concept of evolution as a general law to the method of evolution. This biologist, whilst making many ingenious suggestions as to the reaction of external causes on life and habit such as changes of climate, food supply, and geological upheavals, and so forth really held as his fundamental proposition that living organisms changed because they wanted to. As he stated it, the great factor in evolution was use and disuse. If you have no eyes and want to see, you will finally get eyes. If, like a mole, you have eyes and don't want to see, you will lose your eyes. If you like eating the tender tops of trees enough to make you concentrate all your energies on

the stretching of your neck, you will finally get a long neck like the giraffe.

It is just by this process that a man sprawling on the ice with a bruised chin becomes a skater. The process is not continuous as it would be if mere practice had anything to do with it; for though you may improve at each trial during the lesson, when you begin your next lesson you do not begin at the point at which you left off; you relapse apparently to the beginning. Finally you succeed quite suddenly, and do not relapse again. More miraculous still, you at once exercise the new power unconsciously. You have a new faculty, and must have created some new bodily tissue as its organ, and you have done it solely by willing. For here there can be no question of natural selection or survival of the fittest. The man who is learning to skate has no advantage over the non-skater in the struggle for existence: quite the contrary. He has acquired a new habit, an automatic unconscious habit, solely because he wanted to, and kept trying until it was added unto him.

But when your son tries to skate in his turn, he does not pick up the accomplishment where you left it. The set-back that occurred between your lessons occurs here. The race learns exactly as the individual learns. Your son relapses apparently to the beginning. Now this is odd; for certain other habits of yours, equally acquired, equally unconscious, are transmitted without any perceptible relapse.

For instance, your son yells as he enters the world; he breathes; he circulates his blood; he sucks his food; he cuts teeth; later, he eliminates himself by death. These habits are so rooted, so automatic that he must do them in spite of himself.

We have here a routine, which given time enough for it to operate will finally produce the most elaborate forms of organized life on Lamarckian lines without the intervention of natural selection at all. An amoeba by this process of acquisitions becomes a man.

The moment we form a habit we want to get rid of the consciousness of it so as to economize our consciousness for fresh conquests of life, as all consciousness means preoccupation and obstruction. We can lose a habit and discard an organ just as we acquired them; but this process is slow and broken by relapses; and relics of the organ and the habit long survive its use. And if other and still indispensable habits and modifications have been built on the ones we wish to discard, we must provide a new foundation for them before we demolish the old one. This is also a slow process and a very curious one.

The relapses between the efforts to acquire a habit are important because, as we have seen they recur not only from effort to effort in the case of the individual, but from generation to generation in the case of the race. Butler sees this relapsing from generation to generation as an invariable characteristic of the evolutionary process. Although the parents are full grown adults when a child is conceived, he

had to go back and begin as a speck of protoplasm, and to struggle through an embryonic lifetime, during part of which he had neither skull nor back-bone. With these acquired, he was for some time doubtful whether he was a bird or a fish. He had to compress untold centuries of development into nine months before he was human enough to break loose as a human being. And even then he was incomplete.

The time may come when the same force that compressed the development of millions of years into nine months may pack many more millions into even a shorter space; so that persons may be born able to walk, talk, and play the piano. But they will still begin as specks of protoplasm and acquire these faculties in a late stage of embryonic life. They must recapitulate the history of mankind in their own persons however briefly they may condense it. This recapitulation widened human possibilities to the extent of enabling Butler to hope that the most prolonged and difficult operations to men's minds may yet become instantaneous or instinctive. It also directed Butler's attention to examples of the packing up of centuries into seconds in the skill of natural mathematicians, natural musicians. These are cases in which a long, laborious, conscious process of acquirement has been condensed into an instinctive and unconscious inborn one.

From 1830 until 1859 when Darwin turned the world upside down by his Origin of Species, there was a slump in Evolutionism. This slump not only heightened the impression

of entire novelty when Darwin brought the subject to the front again; it probably prevented him from realizing how much had been done before, even by his own grandfather, to whom he was accused by Butler of being unjust. Besides he was on a new tack in his view.

Paley had put the argument in an apparently unanswerable form. If you found a watch full of mechanism exquisitely adapted for measuring time, could you believe that it was not the work of a cunning designer? And here was a far more wonderful thing than a watch, a man with all his organs ingeniously contrived? Was it conceivable that this was the work of chance? That there was no purpose in this, no design, no guiding intelligence? If only some genius, while admitting Paley's facts, could knock the brains out of Paley by the discovery of a method whereby watches could happen without watchmakers, that genius was assured of such a welcome from the thought of his day as no natural philosopher had ever enjoyed before.

The time being thus ripe, the genius appeared; and his name was Charles Darwin. And now, what did Darwin really discover?

Once again let us call in the giraffe, the example of much Evolution controversy. How did he come by his long neck? Lamarck would have said, by wanting to get at the tender leaves high up on the tree, and trying until he succeeded in wishing the necessary length of neck into existence. Darwin pointed out that an explanation, involving neither

will nor purpose nor designer was possible. If your neck is too short to reach your food, you die. That may be the simple explanation of the fact that all the surviving animals that feed on foliage have necks or trunks long enough to reach it. So out goes your belief that the necks must have been designed to reach the food. But Lamarck did not believe that the necks were so designed in the beginning; he believed that the long necks were evolved by wanting and trying. Not necessarily, said Darwin. Consider the effect on the giraffes of the natural multiplication of their numbers, according to the theory of Malthus. All the animals who happen to be an inch or so above the average will be better fed and stronger than the others. They will secure the strongest and tallest mates; and their progeny will survive whilst the average ones and the sub-average ones will die out. This process, by which the species gains in reach, will repeat itself until the giraffe's neck is so long that he can always find food enough within his reach, at which point, of course, the selective process stops and the length of the giraffe's neck stops with it. And this, without will, purpose, design or even consciousness beyond the blind will to satisfy hunger. It is true that this blind will, being in effect a will to live, gives away the whole case; but still as compared to the open-eyed intelligent wanting and trying of Lamarck, the Darwinian process may be described as a chapter of accidents. When the whole significance of

this dawns upon you, you see a hideous fatalism about it.^x

Thus did the neck of the giraffe reach out across the whole heavens and make men believe that what they saw there was a gloaming of the gods. For if this sort of selection could turn an antelope into a giraffe, it could conceivably turn amoebae into men. Though Lamarck's way, the way of life, will, desire remained still possible, this newly shown way of hunger, death, chance, and bare survival was also possible: was indeed most certainly the way in which many apparently designed transformations had actually come to pass.

How was it that Darwin was hailed as a deliverer and prophet, whilst poor Lamarck was swept aside as a crude and exploded guesser hardly worthy to be named as his erroneous forerunner? The answer is that Darwin's theory of Natural Selection swept away all ideas of a cruel jealous god and showed science as the savior.

Darwin converted the crowd, too, because his theory of evolution by Natural Selection was easier to understand than that of Lamarck. Evolution as a philosophy and physiology of the will seems a mystical process. Though the phenomena of use and disuse, of wanting and trying are familiar enough as facts, they are puzzling as subjects of thought and lead into metaphysics as you try to account for them. But men using the process of artificial selective breeding in plants and animals found it easy to understand

natural selection doing on a huge scale what they were doing on a small scale. Then too they were aware of sexual selection and the survival of the fittest. If you are familiar with these three processes: the survival of the fittest, sexual selection, and variation leading to new kinds, you can easily understand Darwinism.

Samuel Butler felt that he knew quite well what Natural Selection contrasted with Creative Evolution amounted to; and when he found that Darwinism was becoming a substitute for conventional religion, he attacked it just as relentlessly as he had attacked the conventional religion in The Fair Haven and Erewhon.

After having published his theory of memory in Life and Habit, Butler examined that of Professor Hering, an eminent physiologist at Vienna. The importance Butler attached to Hering's views is shown by the fact that he translated the address and included it in Unconscious Memory. Hering did indeed anticipate Butler's hypothesis of continued personality from generation to generation, and of the working of unconscious memory throughout; moreover, Hering went on to discover what memory was, whereas Butler had been satisfied to describe its activity, at the same time connecting it specifically with the phenomena of heredity. Hering asserted that memory was due to vibrations of the nerve fibres; occurrences, therefore, which have made small impression upon us will awake only faint vibrations; whereas those characteristics which are common to many things will easily reproduce themselves, and the

vibrations will be correspondingly more intense. Butler did not commit himself to this hypothesis, though he leaned strongly towards it, and returned to the idea in the Conclusion of Luck or Cunning? in advocating the unity of mind and matter.

Unconscious Memory includes a chapter in translation from Von Hartmann's Philosophy of the Unconscious with comment by Butler to explain the difference between Hartmann's "Unconscious" as an all-creating personality and his own theory of the unconscious processes in mind and memory.

Butler considers objections to his view of unconscious memory. Throughout the inorganic as well as the organic world it may be said that like antecedents are always followed by like consequents; that there is uniformity of action in atoms; that with a little ingenuity memory might be introduced into the inorganic world also; and that memory cannot, for example be connected with those diseases of old age which occur long after the time for reproduction has gone by.

These criticisms were not considered valid by Butler. As we advance in life he said, we live less by inherited memory than by details of memory gathered from personal experiences which are pieced together by ourselves, and this is true of all those actions which are new in their general scope, but which in detail are not new. This second kind of memory is "the memory of our own antecedents."

With regard to the atoms of inorganic nature "the sameness of action of like persons placed under like circumstances for the first time, resembles the sameness of action

of inorganic matter under the same combinations; so it is not remarkable that a son inheriting his father's constitution should, as an old man make the same mistakes as his father. Gout, cancer, and the diseases of old age are thus explained without the intervention of any sort of inherited memory."^x

The theory of evolution, as Butler looked at it, was not primarily a scientific theory about animals; it was a practical working notion about men. It had two main aspects, 1. inherited or unconscious memory which was habit, and 2, cunning or will or striving, in place of the blind chance of "natural selection" as the basis of variation and therefore of the evolutionary process. Personality continued through the ages from generation to generation, each ego inheriting the memory of its ancestors and being able to reproduce by inherited habit its ancestors' ways of coping with familiar situations. That was one side of the doctrine: the other side came into play when the ego was faced with a new situation to which its inherited memory supplied no valid answer. What happened then? According to Darwin, there were variations of unexplained origin, and those "variations" which the new situation happened to suit survived, whereas the "unfitted" died. This was natural selection. According to Butler, what happened was essentially different. The ego faced with the unfamiliar situation tried to adapt itself and

sometimes succeeded if the gap between the precepts of inherited memory and the needs of the new situation were not too wide. The adaptation, once achieved, became in its turn an inheritable memory, and in course of time a habit. For Butler, the beauty of the theory was that it put back mind and will into the centre of the evolutionary picture, whereas the Darwinians, in the name of scientific necessity, were in fact reducing everything to blind chance. They could not explain variation but treated it merely as an accident, and in making everything depend on it, make chance the sole master of man's fate. This seemed to Butler as unscientific as it was unsatisfying. He wanted a world ruled by laws, not by chance, and at the same time he wanted man to be the master of his own affairs. Variation by "cunning" not by "luck" plus unconscious memory transmitted from generation to generation gave him the answer he wanted, and he embraced it with enthusiasm.

Luck or Cunning? sets forth the position Butler held against Darwin and shows how the very existence of evolution is bound up with it, and how the question at issue affects the view we take of life in a variety of ways. The plan of the book was changed as Butler was deflected by comments on the writings of Herbert Spencer, George Romanes, Grant Allen, Ray Lankester.

In discussing the work of Romanes and Darwin, Butler states that he found them both obscure because each had a tendency to appear to differ from others with whom they are

really in agreement. Such a method gave a semblance of originality to their work.

Butler's mode of procedure would have been to state precisely the doctrines of the older evolutionists, then to say in what way he differed from them. Darwin never did this, partly as Butler believed because he felt so insecure about his own conclusions that all the time he had to be wrapping them in vague woolly sentences which should serve also as loopholes of escape should escape become necessary. His studied literary habit was showing itself also in his intellectual successors. And it was this painful obscurantism, this scientific chiaroscuro that Butler felt bound to attack.

As the boom in Darwinism continued, Butler led a small reaction. Darwin, Butler said, was "the heir to a discredited truth and left behind him a discredited fallacy"; furthermore he had other disadvantages to fight against. Grant Allen in his biography Charles Darwin had heaped fulsome adulation upon the evolutionist. Again, according to Ray Lankester, it was sheer heresy to oppose Darwin.

Butler sees Darwin as the apostle of luck. According to Darwin, the Lamarckian view is not a sound one. Some organisms are so admirably adapted to their surroundings, and some organs discharge their functions with such provision, that we are apt to think they owe their development to sense of need; but this opinion is fantastic; the appearance of design is delusive; what we are tempted to see as an accumulated out-

come of desire and cunning, we should regard as mainly an accumulated outcome of good luck.

Take the eye as an example. The main means of developing the eye was, according to Darwin, not use as varying circumstances might direct, with slow increase of power and an occasional happy flight of genius, but natural selection. What, then, is natural selection?

Darwin has told us this on the title-page of the Origin of Species, defining it there as The Preservation of Favored Races; Favored is Fortunate, and Fortunate is Lucky; it is plain, therefore that Darwin regarded natural selection as The Preservation of Lucky Races and luck as the most important feature of evolution. The point just touched upon involves the only essential difference between the systems of Darwin and those of Buffon, Erasmus Darwin and Lamarck. All four writers agree that animals and plants descend with modification; all agree that the fittest alone survive; all agree about the important consequences of the geometrical ratio of increase. The fittest alone survive - but the fittest from among what? Is the survival of the fittest to be taken as meaning the survival of the luckiest or the survival of the cunningest? With Darwin's natural selection the central idea is luck, while with the Erasmus Darwinian system the central idea is cunning. Which is more important? Cunning which on the whole knows what it is aiming at and makes every use of chance opportunities that come its way; or luck, which is con-

tinually turning up in the world, but which from its very nature can have no designed relation to the luck that has gone before it? Cunning does not include conscious attention and forethought; therefore with cunning Butler would connect memory as making a continuity throughout the life of the organism. Luck can have no such continuity since it is necessarily spasmodic, one phase being isolated from another. Otherwise it ceases to be luck.

According to Charles Darwin, "the preservation of favored or lucky races is by far the most important means of modification; according to Erasmus Darwin effort is unquestionably the most potent means; roughly, therefore, there is no better way of putting the matter than to say that Charles Darwin is the apostle of luck and Erasmus Darwin and Lamarck of cunning.

The transition from a world governed chiefly by luck to one in which mind plays no part is not far to seek. In the eighteen-seventies, as a direct result of the prevailing biological theories, Butler noted the concurrent development of a mechanistic conception of the universe and what he calls a "protoplasm boom". The biologists shouted, "Great is protoplasm. There is no life but protoplasm, and Huxley is its prophet."X The conclusion that these eminent scientists arrived at was that the protoplasmic parts of the body are alone truly living while the non-protoplasmic parts are non-living. So Huxley proceeded to show that men and

women are nothing else than "conscious automata", thought and feeling being only "bye-products or cerebration" which have no material causative influences. Butler was in the keenest opposition both to the mindless conception of the universe and the protoplasm boom. He pointed out that if protoplasm was the only centre of life it must unite all life into a single body, and hence must be considered as the life of the world. So protoplasm would become identified with God, who of all fleshly forms chose this to manifest himself. "Our biologists were fast nearing the conception of a God who was both personal and material, but who could not be made to square with pantheistic notions inasmuch as no provision was made for the inorganic world."^x Instead of allowing himself to be involved in such difficulties, Butler preferred to assert that the protoplasmic parts of the body are only more living than the non-protoplasmic. With this position is involved the whole of his philosophy of the inseparability of life and death, of degrees of death in life, and vice versa.

To people like Huxley who were struggling to get rid of the Early Victorian notion of God and with it would banish mind also, there was no doubt something incomprehensible in a position like Butler's. Mind to them, no doubt, smacked somehow of spirit, and spirit of mystic, religious associations. And probably they could not get rid of the idea that to have design there must be an outside designer. Butler however, explained what he meant. The God he believed

in was God in no mystic sense; and the design that was in the universe was part and parcel of it. So at a time when materialism and fatalism were prevalent, when scientists and writers were approaching all sorts of delicate questions by the light of the crude method of Darwinism, it was perhaps not surprising that Butler was treated with little concern. We must remember, however, that if Butler saw a crude Darwinism, biologists like Huxley saw a crude Lamarckianism.

Butler points out that there is hardly an opinion on the subject of descent with modification which does not find support in some one passage or another of the Origin of Species. Indeed it is not easy to imagine any facts that, properly manipulated, it would fail to explain. "If it were desired to show that there is no substantial difference between the doctrine of Erasmus Darwin and that of his grandson, it would be easy to make out a good case for this."^x

In Chapters XLIII and XLIV of Luck or Cunning? Butler discusses the justification of Charles Darwin in claiming the theory of descent as his own. Butler is annoyed by the opening sentences of the Origin of Species which give us a picture of a solitary thinker who had never heard of Buffon, Erasmus Darwin or Lamarck. Yet according to Grant Allen, the biographer of Charles Darwin, "everywhere around him as he grew up, these great but formless evolutionary theories were brewing and fermenting."

Butler quotes from the original edition ninety-seven

passages in which Darwin claimed the theory of descent either expressly by speaking of "my theory" or by implication as in the opening paragraphs of the Origin of Species. In later editions these "my's" were gradually altered to the, our, this. Butler wrote an explanation of Darwin's theory as a disinterested person might have written it, in which this sentence occurs. "If you ask me in what my discovery consists, I reply in this; that the variations which we are all agreed accumulate are caused - by variation."^x

The value of Darwin's work as having led to the general acceptance of evolution is admitted by Butler, but he will not share in lavishing on him the fulsome adulation that is given by Grant Allen and Ray Lankester.

In considering objections to the Lamarckian system, Butler takes up the threadbare one that Professor Semper, though he has adduced an immense number and variety of cases of structural change in animals and plants brought about in the individual by adaptation to new conditions, has never been able to show that such change was transmitted from parent to offspring. To this Butler replies that no one does actually see the hour hand of a clock moving.

Butler finds that the greater part of the Origin of Species is devoted to proving the theory of descent with modification,... and that the fortunate^{it}ness of the variations is kept as far as possible in the background. He admits that it is in great measure through Mr. Darwin's books that descent has

become so widely accepted, but that it has become so in spite of, rather than by reason of, his doctrine.

In Butler's opinion Lamarck was the Lazarus of biology; his theory was never fully understood or thoroughly discussed, not at least in connection with the name of its propounder. Butler sees Charles Darwin as being not displeased to be thought the originator of the theory of descent with modification, and as not wanting fuller knowledge of Lamarck brought forward.

Butler dwells on the defects of Darwin in both work and character remarking that Darwin's accuracy was not to be relied on when it came into conflict with his interests as a leader in the scientific world.

In Butler's view it is impossible to draw a hard and fast line between the living and the non-living. It must be remembered that everything he wrote on biological subjects was a development of the sections in Erewhon dealing with the livingness of machines - of which Huxley's conscious automata theory is the complete converse. Machines, as we have seen, are the extensions of the personality of those who use them. And the same is true of property generally. "It is the last of ego and the first of non-ego." And so a man's body with its concomitant organs is property carried to the bitter end. Hence we speak of our "organic wealth". We may see from all this the frequent union between ego and non-ego; and in what Butler calls "incorporate tools", like the eye or the tooth, there is not a little of the non-ego element. As ego and

non-ego are inseparable, so are life and death. The common basis underlying both of them is change.

Butler sees mind and matter as one living thing. "Everything is living which is in close communion with, and interpermeated by mind or thought". We shall never get straight till we leave off trying to separate mind and matter; each is a function of the other; you must have both or neither.

Plants then must have the same sense of pleasure and pain, memory, power of will and intelligent perception of their business as do animals. If, according to Butler, organic modification is mainly due to function, and hence in the closest correlation with mental change, then plants, as well as animals must have minds and power to reflect and reason upon all that most concerns them.

Unwillingness to concede intelligence and cunning to plants is based upon the error of regarding intelligence as the power of being understood by ourselves. Once admit that the evidence of a plant's having intelligence depends upon the efficiency with which it conducts its business, and there will be no difficulty about supposing that in its own sphere a plant is just as intelligent as an animal.

As to the reason for the development of the organic life of the world along only two main lines, Butler insists upon a difference of opinion which occasioned an early subdivision of primordial life. This difference of opinion occurred regarding the question whether it pays better to sit still or to wander abroad. Butler sees the animal development

from the decision to wander; and the plant life from the idea that it is better to be on the lookout to make the best of what comes one's way.

Considering the place in life occupied by plants and animals, Butler says: "Bodily form may be almost regarded as idea and memory in a solidified state." His view of evolution is that it is the cunningest fittest who survive. With the intelligence that is within the organism he coupled an inherited memory, both of which aided it in reaching the goal it aimed at through will and desire and sense of need.

In attempting to assess the contribution of Butler to the theory of evolution, we must take into consideration the place occupied by Darwin, the leader in evolutionary thought at the time.

It must be remembered that when Butler wrote his books on evolution, Darwinism was by no means simply a scientific doctrine. It was ethics, politics, theology; it was everything rolled into one. George Bernard Shaw dramatically traces its effects in materialism, wars, loss of faith. Yet because Darwinism proved disastrous in these fields, it need not be eradicated from biology.

What Charles Darwin had done was not merely to make out a case for believing in evolution, but to present that case in a form which seemed to leave no room for the action of mind or will in shaping the order of things. This it was, and not evolution as such, that seemed to Butler to empty God and man together out of the course of nature, as creative

forces, and to leave only a mindless interaction of law and chance. Chance variations or "sports", flung into an environment ruled by inexorable laws, survived or perished according to a process of Natural Selection into which God's will nor man's will appeared to enter at all.

There was a babel of tongues for and against Darwin - for and against the entire doctrine of the evolution of species. The challenge to God's power was fundamental; for could God possibly be supposed to have created a world not subject to the rule of mind, but swept along upon the unguided wheels of chance?

Many men simply rejected the whole notion of evolution. But Butler could not, for he was convinced that the theory of evolution was sound, and that Darwin had done great service by demonstrating its truth, at whatever cost to Christian theology. Darwin had gone wrong in stating the theory of evolution in terms of Natural Selection, instead of developing the thought of his grandfather, which had left place for mind and will. Butler wanted to restate Darwin's doctrine in terms which fitted in better with his own experience and observation.

Now Darwin was not conscious of having raised this stupendous issue of a mindless universe, for he was a scientist, not a philosopher. He worked steadily on as a naturalist having no preoccupation with theological speculation. In the words of Butler: "Darwin was perfectly innocent of any inten-

tion of getting rid of mind, and did not, probably, care the toss of a sixpence whether the universe was instinct with mind or no He had no deep-laid plan for pitchforking mind out of the universe or for setting up a scheme of materialist philosophy."x

Darwin was conscious of having discovered a process of transformation and modification which accounted for a good deal of natural history. But he did not put it forward as accounting for the whole of natural history. He revealed it as a method of evolution, not as the method of evolution. It was not his intention to exclude other methods. Though he demonstrated that many transformations which had been taken as functional adaptations to environment (the idea of Lamarck) either certainly were or conceivably might be due to Natural Selection, he was careful not to claim that he had superseded Lamarck or disproved functional adaptation.

Darwin wrote a thoroughly documented book; hence he differs in this from his predecessors, Buffon and Lamarck. He arrived at his conclusions by the patient collection of a vast array of significant facts concerning all sorts of organisms living and extinct. Furthermore his theory applied to all organic evolution.

Butler, on the other hand, was an armchair biologist, not undertaking any experiment, but deriving his data from books, introspection and literary analysis. He drew upon the experiments of others, subjecting them to an acute practical

criticism which sucked out the results he needed.

Though Darwin's theory was a scientific one argued in terms of organic evolution as a whole, it was in effect a philosophical theory bearing on the central conception of human life and purpose. Butler was no scientist, and no judge as to whether the theory was bad science, but it ran counter to the facts of human behavior as he saw them; therefore because the doctrine had been advanced on a scientific basis, he attacked it on that plane, though its effects were fully as much human as scientific. Butler's object then was to turn Lamarckism into scientific fact.

Butler was concerned with human evolution, not really theorizing except incidentally about the evolution of animal species. He was thinking about men and women, as he actually met them and mingled with them. His two hypotheses of inherited memory and creative development seemed to fit the human facts as he knew them. He saw people behaving in ways which seemed to him intelligible only on the assumption of inherited habit; for how could they possibly have learned in their own lifetimes to do, without conscious effort, all the incredibly difficult things which from babyhood they did somehow manage to do? That was one thing; and, for another, he constantly saw people trying to handle new situations, often failing, but sometimes succeeding when the required adaptation of familiar behavior was not too great. If this was the case among men - and he knew it was - why should not the same explanations hold good over the entire field of organic evolution?

No sooner had the idea presented itself than he felt assured of its truth, and certain that the role assigned by Darwin and his interpreters to blind Natural Selection was wrong. That was how Butler came to run full tilt into the great Darwinian controversy while it was still fresh and lively.

Now it seemed to Butler that Darwinism, as far as it rested on the theory of Natural Selection, emptied mind out of the universe as a creative force; and feeling certain that mind was creative and that men's wills did act with effect, he could not accept Darwinism as valid in the field which he felt he knew something about - the field of everyday human living. If, however, Natural Selection did not hold good there, was there any good reason for supposing that it held good elsewhere? Butler felt impelled to challenge, not simply the applicability of Darwinism to the affairs of civilized man, but the whole theory, for it seemed to be all vitiated by its final acceptance of fortuitous variations as the source of progress.

It is quite true that Butler did not do justice to Darwin. He even attacked Darwin's personal character, being unable to bear the fact that the author of so abhorrent a doctrine was an amiable and upright man. In his scorn of the doctrine of Natural Selection, Butler overlooked the importance of its work.

On the other hand Butler was right in drawing attention to the fact that Natural Selection was not a cause of variation. The effect of Darwin's Origin of Species was to

divert attention from the way in which species originate. At the time it was put forward, the explanation of Darwin appeared so satisfying that biologists accepted the notions of variation and heredity there set forth and ceased to take any further interest in the work of the hybridizers. Therefore the work of Gregor Mendel on heredity, which appeared in 1865 was neglected until its discovery by botanists in 1900.

Both Darwin and Butler believed that acquired characteristics and variations in the parent were transmitted to the children. Darwin had set up a tentative theory - Pangenesis - to account for this inheritance. He lived too early to know that mutations and other chromosomal changes take place and that they can produce inheritable changes in organisms. He was therefore unable to explain clearly how some variations are inherited and others are not. Aware of the weaknesses in his theory of Natural Selection, Darwin stated them frankly so that other biologists might study them. He knew that his understanding of the problem was incomplete.

A. Weismann in 1885 in his book The Germplasm helped to clear up the difficulty by making a distinction between germinal variations and sominal variations. To be of any moment in evolutionary change a variation must be inherited. And to be inherited it must be represented in the germ cells. This is the case for those variations now termed mutations.

Even before Mendel's work became known, Bateson in 1895 had begun to call attention to the prevalence of

discontinuity in variation. Hugo de Vries in 1901 published Die Mutations-theorie wherein he showed that new varieties arose from older ones by sudden sharp steps or mutations and not by any process involving the gradual accumulation of minute differences. Both Darwin and Butler had mentioned these "sports" or big jumps. Butler anticipated this distinction: "It may be questioned whether what is called a sport is not the organic expression of discontent which has been long felt, but which has not been attended to, nor been met step by step by as much small remedial modification as was found practicable; so that when a change does come it comes by way of revolution."^x

Darwin in later years gave up his view of "sports" because he thought that the relatively rare sport or mutation would rapidly disappear through the swamping of effects of crossing with the more abundant normal form, and so, even though favored by Natural Selection would never succeed in establishing itself. Mendel's discovery eliminated this difficulty, and De Vries fitted the idea of mutations into Darwin's theory.

In this form the theory of Natural Selection is acceptable to many biologists, though there are differences of opinion about many of its details, and even about the importance of the various factors that Darwin listed.

Objection raised against Darwinism is that many characters are apparently not advantageous. Most of the differences which enable the systematist to distinguish one

species from another serve no apparent purpose, and these are several well established fossil pedigrees in which useless structures have been evolved. Darwinians have a ready reply to this criticism. Often a single inheritable variation affects more than one character of the organism. One may therefore account for the evolution of useless characters by supposing them to be accompanied by unknown advantages. Even a disadvantageous character might prevail if it was linked to a sufficiently profitable adaptation.

Another objection pointed out by Butler seems reasonable: "There is hardly an opinion on the subject of descent with modification which does not find support in some one passage or another of the Origin of Species."^X The hypothesis of Natural Selection is a very formidable explainer of data. Indeed it is not easy to imagine any facts that properly manipulated it would fail to explain. It was this very ability to explain every fact that gave Natural Selection its initial importance. Weismann's challenge of the entire theory of the transmission of acquired characters marked a turning point from the older credulous attitude to the modern demand for more critical evidence. Since Mendel's theory that agents of variation are the genes, it has been discovered that genes can be affected by X-rays and atomic rays. Therefore the theory of Natural Selection may be further modified in the light of fresh evidence.

And what of Butler's hypothesis of evolution? It is surely to the credit of Butler that he strove to work

out a scientific theory to account for human evolution on a basis of human experience and faith. In fact his real religion is human experience.

The main battle over Butler's opinions has always revolved about the question of the inheritance of acquired characters. The battle is apparently won. Scientists now think that characteristics must be acquired in the long run, though there is not sufficient satisfactory evidence. Some biologists have adopted the Lamarckian view, that of variation through function to environment.

Butler emphasizes instinct or inherited memory as the great guide to living. Instinct provides us with successful behavior. A gentleman is born fortunate because he has social instinct. Butler believes that logic complicates living, the way to live life well is to follow instinct. We must remember that Butler is combining human evolution, social evolution and behavior. Scientists do not think that we inherit social behavior.

The social evolution of man has obviously come about by the transmission of the experience of one generation to the next by oral and written instruction. Our thinking is so saturated with this point of view that it was natural to extend it to the bodily structures and behavior of the lower animals. Experience has shown, however, that it is unwise to apply the evidence from one domain to another where an entirely different set of relations is known to exist.

The Hering - Butler theory of the unconscious memory

of heredity was supported by biologists Hartog, Regnano Semon, and Francis Darwin. In an address in connection with the Darwin Celebrations of 1908-9, Francis Darwin, the son of Charles Darwin, placed this theory as a cause of that variation which Natural Selection must have before it can act, and recognized inherited memory or habit as the basis of a rational theory of the development of the individual and of the race. The idea of molecular vibrations as the mechanism of memory has now been replaced by the view of rhythmic chemical changes.^x

Lamarckism was defended by able scientists, among them Herbert Spencer, Vines, Henslow, Cunningham, Cope, Hertwig, Delage. Butler's most illustrious disciple, George Bernard Shaw, went much farther on the same track. Using Butler's philosophical thought, Shaw, through the medium of comedy, applied his criticism in similar manner and extended it to a study of social and economic problems.

In a recent study of Shaw, William Irvine, discusses the influence of Butler, reflected in certain similarities:

"In affirming intelligent design but denying omniscience and omnipotence, in emphasizing the biological advantages of self-consciousness and implying the continuity of mind and memory from one generation to another, Shaw's evolutionary theory strongly suggests the influence of Samuel Butler, and particularly of Luck or Cunning?

Again in conceiving mind and truth as the products of will and effort, Shaw also suggests the influence of Butler. Both men are pragmatists. They look away from principles and

categories toward facts and consequences. They take an instrumental rather than an absolute view of truth, seeing it not so much as conclusions which follow from premises but more as theories which yield fruitful results, whether in evolutionary biology, musical criticism or social reform. Intelligence and its products are functional; or as Shaw says 'mind is a passion.' It springs out of need and desire. In its simplest terms, truth is successful adaptation to environment and thus may be the instinctive possession of an animal as well as the self-conscious possession of a philosopher. Yet whereas Butler seems with romantic obscurantism to prefer the instinctive mind of the animal, Shaw prefers the self-conscious one of the philosopher, which in its ultimate perfection he conceives as the final goal of evolution. And again, whereas Butler is on the whole a cautious pragmatist, accepting ideas because they are fruitful, Shaw sometimes verges on more impressionistic sophistry, accepting ideas because they are imposing, shocking or simply individual."^x

Butler wanted to enlist the moral, religious and biological forces of human nature in the cause of social progress. He demanded of ideas that they satisfy his moral and religious sense, and having decided what to believe, attempted to infuse that belief in others by skilful argument. He merged will with instinct, habit with organic function, mind with unconscious adaptation to environment so that mind, will and habit might take over evolution and dedicate it to rational, moral and social ends.

Butler opposed the abolition of the Church fearing that mechanistic science would step into its place. In Creative Evolution he found what he was seeking, - a satisfactory faith, a rational religion.

CHAPTER FIVE

THE LIVING GOD

Butler's evolutionary philosophy was also his religion.

"The theory that luck is the main means of organic modification is the most absolute denial of God which it is possible for the human mind to conceive - while the view that God is in all His creature, He in them and they in Him is only expressed in other words by declaring that the main means of organic modification is, not luck, but cunning." So Butler concludes in Luck or Cunning? linking God and will as the same thing.

Religion and its place in everyday life, and the conflict between religion and science played a big part in the development of Samuel Butler's mind. He perpetually worried about religion until he settled firmly where he stood about it; then he disposed of the problem to his entire satisfaction.

Butler, when he had lost his faith in orthodox Christianity and had discarded all belief in its miraculous element, remained a theist in the sense that he was sure that the whole universe was animated by a presence to which he gave the name of "God".

In his Notebooks he has expressed certain views concerning this vital spirit.

"The existence of free-will, otherwise cunning, is one of the proofs of the existence of an unseen world, and a means whereby we know the little that we do know of that world."

"God and Life are as one thing."

"God's merits are so transcendent that it is not surprising his faults should be in reasonable proportion."

"God is not so white as he is painted, and he gets on better with the Devil than people think."

"I believe there is an unseen world about which we know nothing as firmly as any one can believe it."

"The world admits that there is another world, that there is a Kingdom, veritable and worth having, which nevertheless is invisible and has nothing to do with any kingdom such as we now see."

"The true laws of God are the laws of our own well-being."

"God does not intend people, and does not like people to be too good. He likes them neither too good nor too bad, but a little too bad is more venial with him than a little too good."

"There is no knowledge of good without a knowledge of evil also, and this is why all nations have devils as well as gods, and regard them with sneaking kindness. God without the devil is dead, being alone."

Such was Butler's theology and it amounted to a sort of panzoism. It was closely connected with his view of human personality which in turn was linked to his doctrine, about inherited memory. This doctrine, indeed, was his key to the whole problem. He considered personality to be continuous between parents and children and in effect between all living things - for he regarded them all as parts of a developing and leavening universal stuff. This stuff was God, the Spirit and Life which creates governs and upholds all living things.

Butler had a profound respect for the religious sentiment without supernaturalism, and a profound disrespect for every scientific theory that seemed to him to dethrone the mind or will that was his idea of God. Out of this arose his search for a theory of evolution that should give mind or will or striving the central place in the scheme of things. As soon as he had lighted on such a theory, the religious question was settled for him. He did not however hit on this central idea until the writing of Life and Habit.

The Victorian Age was till near its end a religious age both in the sense that most people of the middle and higher classes were religious, or took religion for granted and also in the sense that a large proportion of them thought about many things in religious terms. In Butler's youth there was a religious and political calm over that part of English society in which he lived.

This was the calm before the storm; for Darwin's Origin of Species was soon to start up again the battle between

religion and science. Butler however was not led to "doubt" by Darwin, nor by anything connected with the march of science. His starting point was his questioning of the essential dogmas of Christianity, his criticism of the inconsistency of the gospel narratives, his doubt of the scripture stories told by Matthew, Mark, Luke and John.

In his anonymous pamphlet on The Evidence for the Resurrection, Butler questioned the evidence for Christ's ascension from the dead. He developed this subject more fully in The Fair Haven, and much later in his account of the Sunchild myth in Erewhon Revisited.

The book God the Known and God the Unknown sums up Butler's philosophy. The view it put forward was a natural result of the theories set out in Life and Habit. To Butler, God is the living principle to be found in all organisms, and of which we all are co-members.

In this book Butler sets out to do two things: firstly, to show that there does exist a single Spirit, whom "we cannot think of under any meaner name than God"; secondly, to show something more of the bodily expression, the outward mask of this vast living being.

This God is not pantheistic, for Butler does not subscribe to the belief of "those who hold that God is everything, and everything is God." According to Butler this belief is a contradiction in terms, for it is impossible to think of anything as God, or as forming part of God, which

we cannot also think of as a Person, and it is impossible to conceive of "everything" as a person. Pantheists require us to see "everything" as a person which we cannot; or God as not a person which we cannot. Butler sees Pantheism as practically nothing else than Atheism; it has no belief in a personal Deity overruling the affairs of the world as Divine Providence. Pantheism is a mere unconscious principle of life, impersonal, irrational as the brute matter that it quickens.

Atheism was right in the sense that there was no personal God apart from the mind or will of the universe; theism was right in the sense that this mind was divine. "If man is to be in harmony with the dominant opinion of his own and of many past ages, he will see a single God - impregnate substance as having been the parent from which all living forms have sprung. One spirit and one form capable of such modification as its directing spirit shall think fit; one soul and one body; one God and one Life."

Using the analogy of the Tree of Life, Butler sought to show that consciousness extends infinite in area through the universe even in the apparently smallest things. As each cell in the human body is an intelligent soul, so are we in ourselves combined to form some vaster being. "As the myriad organisms are parts and processes of us", Butler wrote, "so are we parts and processes of life at large."

Our forefathers, though they might and did feel

the existence of a personal God in the world, could not form a clear or definite conception until they would have grasped evolution of the old teleological Darwinism, supplemented by a perception of the oneness of personality between parents and offspring, the persistence of memory through all generations, the latency of this memory until rekindled by the recurrence of the associated ideas, and the unconsciousness with which repeated acts come to be performed. In this way we see the idea of a personal God developed by Butler as the mind plus upward striving will, called by Shaw, the creative Life Force, the élan vital present in all living forms upon this earth, a Force quasi-omnipotent and quasi all-wise. Life began when the Life Force entered into matter and guided the molecules into organic form, and continued by instinct and will.

Butler's immortality was of a vicarious type, for he did not believe in a future existence as we commonly understand the words. "We offer immortality", he said, "but not resurrection from the dead." By that he meant immortality in two aspects: physical in that no life ever dies, but is absorbed in the Life Force. "Life is the gathering of waves to a head; at death they break into a million fragments each one of which, however is absorbed at once into the sea of life and helps to form a later generation which comes rolling on till it too breaks."^x And he meant an

individual immortality, in that everyone according to the measure of his worth, will achieve a new life after death in the thoughts and lives of others. Of the life we live in others he thus wrote: "A man should spend his life, or rather does spend his life in being born. His life is his birth throes. But most men miscarry and never come to the true birth at all, and some live but a very short time in a very little world and none are eternal. Still, the life we live beyond the grave is our truest life, and our happiest for we pass it in the profoundest sleep as though we were children in our cradles ... And when we die, we die easily, know neither fear nor pain and live anew in the lives of those who have been begotten of our work and who have for the time come up in our room."

"We had better live in others as much as we can if only because we thus live more in the race, which God really does seem to care about a good deal, and less in the individual, to whom as far as I can see, he is indifferent. After we are dead it matters not to the life we have led in ourselves what people may say of us, but it matters much to the life we lead in others and this should be our true life."x

This theory entered into his thoughts very intimately during later years. It was another tribute to intelligence and consciousness as the things that really matter. So a good deal of his essay How to Make the Best of Life is

concerned not with the conscious life of the individual, but with the life he may live in others after his death.

In his Notebooks Butler had much to say concerning death, and life in the world to come. He notes: "Death is the dissolution of a partnership, ~~the~~ partners to which survive and go elsewhere. It is the corruption or breaking up of that society which we have called Ourselves. The corporation is at an end, both its soul and its body cease as a whole, but the immortal constituents do not cease and never will. The souls of some men transmigrate in great part into their children, but there is a large alloy in respect both of body and mind through sexual generation; the souls of other men migrate into books, pictures, music or what not: and everyone's mind migrates somewhere, whether remembered and admired or the reverse. The living souls of Handel, Shakespeare, Rembrandt, Giovanni Bellini and the other great ones appear and speak to us in their works with less alloy than they could ever speak through their children; but men's bodies disappear absolutely on death, except they be in some measure preserved in their children and in so far as harmonics of all that has been remain.

On death we do not lose life, we lose only individuality; we live henceforth in others, not ourselves. Our mistake has been in not seeing that death is indeed, like birth, a salient feature in the history of the individual, but one which wants exploding as the end of the individual, no less than birth wanted exploding as his beginning."^x

Death deprives us of conscious memory concerning our current life, but we live on in the race. A healthy enjoyment and employment of our life will give us a sufficient reward in that growth of God wherein we may live more truly and effectually after death than we have lived when we were conscious of existence.^x

Here we then have Butler's view of immortality. As we have seen, the word God is in part an expression of our ignorance of the ultimate nature of ourselves and the universe except that we know ourselves to be a part of a continuing Life Force. Butler notes: "To lament that we cannot be more conscious of God and understand him better is much like lamenting that we are not more conscious of our circulation and digestion. Provided we live according to familiar laws of health, the less we think about circulation and digestion the better; and so with the ordinary rules of good conduct, the less we think about God the better. To know God better is only to realize more fully how impossible it is that we should ever know him at all. I cannot tell which is the more childish - to deny Him or to attempt to define Him."

Butler understands God as comprising all living units in His own single person, but asks what was the origin of Life? Who called the God of this world into existence? In answer, Butler conceives God the Unknown - a vaster and more remote Being who looms out behind our God and who stands

in the same relation to Him as He to us. Then on Butler's view of evolution by parity of reason, Life or God should have already passed through a growth analogous to that which we find he has taken upon this earth on an infinite number of past occasions; and the development of each class of life with its culmination in the vertebrate animals and in man, should be due to recollection by God of his having passed through the same stages or nearly so, in worlds and universes, which we know of from personal recollection, as evidenced in the growth and structure of our bodies, but concerning which we have no further knowledge. Butler's system is therefore one of great concentric phases of life - the innermost of which is the cells that comprise us; the second is that of ourselves which form the body of God; the third is that of the God of this world, and beyond this that of God the Unknown in whom all these units meet.

Thus Butler in his scientific books has developed three main lines of thought; at times they touch and meet; at others they emerge as distinct subject for separate consideration, the most important questions that Butler dwelt with. These were his theory of inherited memory; his recognition of the value of the doctrines of the older evolutionists as against the mindless purposeless view of the universe of the Darwinians; and the panzoistic philosophy which grew out of his biological ideas.

Religious theory of course is never consistent with worldly practice, and Butler was no lover of theory. What he

wanted was a greater humanity within the structure of religion itself; it must have a place for the comic as well as the beautiful, for the grotesque no less than the ordinary, for the human equally with the divine. Butler in his essays on Italian art praises these happy people for their perception of these qualities, and admires the spirited character of their work, the manner in which they combine devotion with amusement.

In the essay A Medieval Girl School Butler remarks: "If Christianity is to be a living faith, it must penetrate a man's whole life, so that he can no more rid himself of it than he can of his flesh and bones or of his breathing. What is the essence of Christianity? The essence of Christianity lies neither in dogma nor yet in abnormally holy life, but in faith in an unseen world, in doing one's duty, in speaking the truth, in finding the true life rather in others than in oneself, and in the certain hope that he who loses his life on these behalfs finds more than he has lost."

Butler was far from orthodox Christianity, yet he was a very religious man. Even if we do not take seriously his statement that he thought of himself as a member of the Broad Church, it still remains that in his own view he was building a better foundation for the religion of the future. He believed "that if a man loves God he cannot come to much harm." But he felt that to achieve this security a man must disregard theological dogmas and social conventions completely and listen to the voice of God within himself. He pleaded:

"Above all things let no unwary reader do me the injustice of believing in me If he must believe in anything, let him believe in the music of Handel, the painting of Giovanni Bellini, and the thirteenth chapter of St. Paul's Epistle to the Corinthians."x

CHAPTER SIX

CONCLUSION

The object of this essay has been to show the nature of the philosophy of Samuel Butler, and its development through his life and work. The concluding chapter reviews his position.

Butler's conception of life was mainly occasioned by his sensitive reaction to his cheerless upbringing in the narrow evangelical surroundings of a Victorian household. The Way of All Flesh, his autobiographical novel, gives a cruel, pitiless picture of an ecclesiastical education and its consequences. Though Ernest Pontifex, the "hero" and Butler did not lead entirely similar lives, the likeness is sufficient for Butler to portray his unhappy childhood, his youth and his subsequent emancipation.

In this book, as in Erewhon, Butler did upset the idols of the Victorian temple in that he mocked ideas of respectability, education, art ethics, religion, family life. He dared to attack the home life, a subject then considered sacred. He evidently hated Victorianism because his father was Victorian.

Butler accused the canon of encouraging in him the despicable traits of unquestioning faith and conventional obedience while damping down every speculative impulse. He seems to have felt that his father turned him from a naturally joyous soul with an ardent will to be happy, into a crabbed and unhappy

rebel always expecting to be snubbed down.

Once independent of his father, Butler obeyed his speculative impulse. He rejected Christian orthodoxy in the search for a rational religion that would satisfy him. Instead of his harsh critical attitude toward Christianity, there appears a more sympathetic intelligence, a respectful, liberal attitude which grows, gathers strength and finally conquers. Butler has a faith of his own in which almost mystical elements are added to the findings of reason. In the memory of ourselves that we leave, in the lasting fruitfulness of our actions, we find an immortality on this earth. The divine is imminent in the universe; and beyond the known God whom our reflection can compass, God the Unknown dwells in infinite space.

Though Butler was one of the first disciples of Charles Darwin, his support of the theory of evolution did not prevent him from applying it humorously to machines and picturing the prospect of a world in which they would reduce their masters to slavery. Butler then had the problem of formulating an adequate philosophy of nature in which the physical and biological sciences could be merged into a new synthesis. A philosophy of the new society involved criticism of the ends of human action, a clarification of the content of the good life, and a criticism and formulation of the technique of social control. The religious problem, now changed in form, required an adjustment of the values of a

personalistic philosophy to the scientific knowledge of naturalism.

Denying the purely mechanical process of natural selection and the resulting materialism, Butler made evolution take the place of Providence and saw progressive social betterment as the end of life. As a convinced Lamarckian Butler believed that qualities directly induced by new functions and surroundings may be added to the racial repertory by hereditary entailment, and that they may be cumulatively increased by contributions made by individual parents. To many biological evolutionists this possibility appears ~~im-~~proved and even improbable.

Butler was of an "experiencing nature"; he based his writing on his acquaintance with human life as he had observed it. His evolutionary philosophy was pragmatic in its methods, empirical in its conclusions. His pragmatism showed two main tendencies: emphasizing its scientific use, it plunged philosophy deeply into the facts of experience; emphasizing its religious use, it freed thought from logical consistency and permitted it to identify truth and mind with will and power.

Butler was thinking in terms of life and the living. Creative evolution implies Life or Mind as the efficient cause of the course of events in living creatures. To Butler every cell or atom is a living thing. All organisms have memory, consciousness and will through which they adapt themselves

to the environment. In discussing our subordinate personalities Butler states: "Every individual person is a compound creature being made up of an infinite number of distinct centres of sensation and will, each one of which is personal, and has a soul and individual existence, a reproductive system, intelligence and memory of its own, with probably its hopes and fears, its times of scarcity and repletion, and a strong conviction that it is itself the centre of the universe."^x

As we have within us so many tributary souls, so do we in turn form the component atoms of that compound creature Life, which continues the race. We all are part of the unending life stream, each one of us being the primordial cell which never died or dies but has differentiated itself into all living beings whatever.

The very essence of personality involves the probable unity of all animal and vegetable life as being nothing but one single creature of which the component members are individual cells, life being a sort of leaven which, if once introduced into the world, will leaven it altogether.

Life as a whole does not die; its daily waste is carried on by the conscious death of its individual members; its daily repair is carried on by conscious reproduction of its component items. Concerning death Butler notes: "On death we do not lose life, we lose only individuality; we live henceforth in others, not in ourselves..... If we would retain personal identity at all, we must continue it beyond what

we call death, in which case death ceases to be what we have hitherto thought it, that is to say, the end of our being."

Butler's evolutionary theory has two aspects: inherited memory or habit, and design or cunning. Butler identifies memory with heredity; he inverts the whole concept of the subconscious or the unconscious and makes instinctive living the ideal. His remark then has significance: "Is life worth living? That is a question for the embryo, not for man." Memory and heredity are the means of preserving experiences, but they do not originate. The increment in each generation at the moment of its being an increment, has nothing to do with memory or heredity, but is due to change in conditions.

"Design comes in at the moment that a living being either feels a want and forecasts for its gratification or utilizes some waif or stray of accident on the principle which underlies all development that enough is a little more than one has. It is the business of memory to conserve and to transmit from one generation to another that which has been furnished by design or by accident designedly turned to account."^x

When a human being meets a new situation he thinks consciously until he has mastered the problem; then the acquirement becomes unconscious and is transmitted to succeeding

generations in time becoming perfected as an instinct. Life then becomes an endeavor to master problems to do them automatically. Since consciousness means preoccupation and abstraction, the most successful lives are those of inborn memory, of inherited habit and behavior.

The logic of Butler's position is that human life would become unconscious; but he does not look to that, for he notes: "My theory of the unconsciousness does not lead to universal unconsciousness, but only to pigeon-holing and putting by. We shall always get new things to worry about. If I thought that by learning more and more I should ever arrive at the knowledge of absolute truth I would leave off studying. But I believe I am pretty safe."^x

Butler assigns limits to reason in the life of the organism, and states the rights of instinct and intuition. Though he makes unconscious living the ideal of life, he does not rule out genius and originality. But he cautions that the forward man, the innovator must not be too far in front of other people, otherwise he will be entirely isolated from them; there will be no connecting links by which to attach himself to those he would lead after him.

Evolution is both instinctive and conscious. Conscious evolution occurs in two stages. Because of change, a genius enunciates some new idea. Being a precocious sport and therefore maladjusted to his environment, he is persecuted by his contemporaries. Then the second stage begins. The

The masses adopt his idea, and worship the genius that has passed through the fire. "So men of genius always escape their own immediate belongings and indeed generally their own age."

Butler, conceiving mind and truth as the product of will and effort, considers truth relative not absolute. "Error springs from supposing there is any absolute right or absolute truth, and also from supposing that truth and right are any the less real for being not absolute but relative. Whenever we push truth hard she runs to earth in contradiction in terms, that is to say, in falsehood. Truth should never be allowed to become extreme; otherwise it will be apt to meet and to run into the extreme of falsehood. The pursuit of truth is chimerical. That is why it is so hard to say what truth is. There is no permanent absolute unchangeable truth; what we should pursue is the most convenient arrangement of our ideas."^x

Butler made an intimate and original relationship of ideas throughout his work. He showed no conscious striving after consistency but a fitting of all ideas into his general outlook. He made intelligence the keystone of his philosophy and used it towards rational, moral and social ends.

Repeatedly demonstrating that it was unwise to push logic to extremes, Butler regarded life as a matter of illogical compromise. He noted: "There are no unshakable principles. In practice it is seldom very hard to do one's duty

when one knows what it is; but it is sometimes exceedingly difficult to find this out. The difficulty, however, is often reducible into that of knowing what gives pleasure, and this though difficult is a safer guide and more easily distinguished. In all cases of doubt the promptings of a kindly disposition are more trustworthy than the conclusions of logic and sense is better than science.... Logic is like the sword - those that appeal to it shall perish by it..... Faith is appealing to the living God"...^x

The Way of All Flesh is an excellent portrayal of the creed of Butler and a dramatization of his evolutionary philosophy. In fact the novel might be used to illustrate each point, as has been done in the study of it by G. D. H. Cole.^x Butler goes back to the third generation to explain his hero. Ernest's father and grandfather are both bad. About his own great-grandfather Butler knew nothing; hence in John Pontifex, the village carpenter, Butler hypothesized a source for the elements of decency and strength in Ernest's character. John Pontifex is an "unconscious knower"; he lives "under grace". His son George is an "irregular, abnormal growth, a sudden divergence". George's sons, especially Theobald, Ernest's father, suffer from this sudden interruption to the normal evolutionary development.

Alethea, Ernest's aunt, is a "sport", an apparently causeless variation. Towneley, the "ideal gentleman" to

x - The Notebooks of Samuel Butler. First Principles.

x - Samuel Butler and The Way of All Flesh.

both Butler and Ernest, is rich, generous, gifted with attributes of serenity and good manners, resulting from unconscious memory.

The novel may be regarded as a practical illustration of the theory of heredity propounded in Life and Habit. What it really shows is: "If a man is to enter the kingdom of Heaven, he must do so, not only as a little child, but as a little embryo, or rather as a little zoosperm - and not only this, but as one that has come of zoosperms which have entered into the kingdom of Heaven before him for many generations."X

Throughout his writings Butler reiterated his hatred of sham and pretense of humbug and deceit. He advocated living according to the mean, the balance of common sense as opposed to the absurd extreme of logic. In contrast to the unlovely manner of Christian living in the Pontifex home, Butler presented in Erewhon Revisited a charming picture of Yram, her husband, her son George as pleasant, happy people who have succeeded admirably by putting the philosophy of the mean into practical effect. The art of living, Butler held, was to keep a balance of common sense between the vital inheritance of unconscious memory and the equally vital capacity for adaptation.

Butler, like Ernest Pontifex, was not downed by difficulties. In spite of misfortunes and disappointments, he entered into a useful and happy life.

G. D. H. Cole notes that Butler for all his audacity in writing was by nature a timid soul and "never ceased to be afraid of his own deviations from the normal." He finds instances of Butler's timidity in his avoidance of marriage, family and social life, and in his philosophy of limited adaptive power.

In my opinion Butler was a solitary worker and a cautious man who took nothing on trust, inverted the current beliefs, and worked out a faith founded upon human experience.

With impish perversity Butler turned the Victorian world inside out, yet remained a conservative of the old school, of middle class spirit and conscience. Thus to him the best morality was that which may best ensure the getting of all those things "which work together for good to them that love God"; they are "good health, good looks, good sense, experience, a kindly nature and a fair balance of cash in hand." A religious or moral system that fosters these has no cause to fear attack.

Neglected in his own lifetime, Butler has since been endowed with that immortality so often considered by him when he expressed his faith in a posterity.

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